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1 Glossary of Terms 
After the Event (ATE) Insurance: an insurance policy which covers one party against 
the risk of having to pay the opposing party’s legal costs in the event that the action 
fails.  
Assignment: in the context of this report, an assignment is taken to be an assignment 
of a cause of action. The assignment may be of a cause of action which vests in the 
insolvent estate, such as an action for breach of duty. Alternatively, in the corporate 
context, since 1st October 2015 an administrator or liquidator may assign an office-
holder cause of action under section 246ZD of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Conditional Fee Arrangements (CFAs): agreements between a lawyer and client where 
the lawyer receives payment of his or her own fees only if the action is successful. The 
agreement will usually also provide for the lawyer to benefit from a percentage uplift 
when the case is won limited to 100% of base fees and subject to assessment by the 
court at the request of the paying party.  
Funder: a third party with no connection to the legal dispute but who funds, at least 
some part of, the costs of the action.  
Insolvency Litigation: actions brought by liquidators, administrators and trustees in 
bankruptcy. 
Jackson Reforms: reforms recommended by Lord Justice Jackson in his Review of 
Civil Litigation Costs and brought into effect by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
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2 Foreword 
I have had the privilege in recent years of being entrusted by various stakeholders in 
the UK’s insolvency firmament to look at various different practical issues. I was 
extremely pleased to be approached in the Summer of 2019 by Manolete Partners plc to 
conduct research in order to assess the current state of play in the insolvency litigation 
funding market. Insolvency litigation, and how to fund it, has been a live issue for a 
number of years. I have twice previously looked at the law and practice in this area 
reporting my empirical findings in 2014 and 2016. The legal framework has since 
moved on. This report attempts to assess where we are now, in relation to what is 
happening in practice, and considers what insolvency practitioners should be doing 
when assessing what to do with a potential legal cause of action. 
I am most grateful to Manolete Partners plc, and in particular its CEO, Steven Cooklin 
and non-executive director, former Chief Bankruptcy Registrar Baister. Although 
ensuring my report has been produced entirely independently they have assisted me 
with their experienced insights and most generously with access to confidential 
information about Manolete Partners plc’s case load. In addition, it is important to note 
that the project would not have been possible without the active support of the ICAEW 
and IPA. My thanks go in particular to the ICAEW’s Bob Pinder and the IPA’s Michelle 
Thorp. I am also extremely grateful to all the insolvency professionals who responded 
to my online survey and particularly to the stakeholders who kindly gave up their 
valuable time to be interviewed. A large number of insolvency practitioners, insolvency 
lawyers, funders, insurers and brokers were most generous with their time, 
experiences and wisdom. 
 
 
Professor Peter Walton 
University of Wolverhampton 
April 2020 
  
Page 4 of 61 
 
3 Introduction 
The purpose of this project is to assess how insolvency litigation is currently funded 
and to highlight concerns or significant issues which face different stakeholders. The 
main theme which runs through this report is the duty of insolvency office holders to 
exercise their powers for the benefit of creditors. 
The report begins with an outline of the recent history of the legal framework 
governing how insolvency litigation has operated up to the present day. 
An assessment of legal and practical issues affecting how insolvency practitioners 
(“IPs”) carry out their duty to act in the best interests of creditors is then made. 
This is followed by an examination and analysis of qualitative and quantitative data 
which considers: 1) the results of an online survey of IPs carried out between 
September and December 2019; 2) certain data kindly made available by Manolete 
Partners plc which sheds light on the amount of insolvency claims which require 
funding; and 3) the views of various IPs and other stakeholders interviewed between 
October 2019 and February 2020. 
From the above data a number of perceived issues with how the current system 
operates are identified and possible reforms are suggested which might lead to an 
increase in returns to creditors. 
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4  Outline of the recent history of the legal framework governing insolvency 
litigation 
The Jackson Reforms1 came into force in 2013 under the terms of the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (‘LASPO’). LASPO made changes 
both to the law and procedure governing how civil litigation is conducted in the UK. It 
generally abolished the right for successful claimants to claim, from a losing 
defendant, any uplift on a conditional fee agreement (‘CFA’) and the premium payable 
for after-the-event (“ATE”) insurance (a policy taken out to safeguard against the 
possibility of suffering an adverse costs order if the claim is unsuccessful).2 Jackson LJ 
had observed, in general terms, that the way CFAs had operated (often with 100% uplifts 
and deferred ATE premiums) was the cause of disproportionate costs incurred by 
successful claimants. His Lordship had found that in the cases he had analysed, 
claimant costs in CFA cases had ranged from between 158% and 203% of the damages 
awarded.3  
In recognition of the unique public policy issues involved, insolvency litigation4 was 
granted an exemption from the LASPO reforms, initially for two years but subsequently  
extended5 for a further year. The insolvency “carve-out” came to an end in April 2016.6 
The Jackson Reforms were introduced with little or no consideration of their impact 
upon insolvency litigation.7 Although the Government committed itself to a Post 
                                                          
1 The Reforms are based upon Lord Justice  Jackson’s recommendations found in Review of 
Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report TSO (December 2009) (see also the Review of Civil Litigation 
Costs: Preliminary Report Volumes One and Two TSO (May 2009) and the Government’s 
subsequent consultation Proposals for Reform of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England 
and Wales – Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s Recommendations (Cm 7947, November 
2010) and its response to the results of that consultation Reforming Civil Litigation Funding and 
Costs in England and Wales – Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s Recommendations - 
The Government Response (Cm 8041, March 2011). 
2 These specific changes were made by amendments to the Access to Justice Act 1999. 
3 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report TSO (December 2009) at paragraph 2.20. The 
cases his Lordship considered do not appear to be insolvency cases. 
4 In this context insolvency litigation in general terms refers to litigation brought by liquidators 
or administrators of companies or trustees in bankruptcy. See Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No 5 and Saving Provision) Order 2013 SI 
2013/77 art 4 and the Ministerial Statement dated 24th May 2012 by the then Minister of Justice 
Jonathan Djanogly. 
5 See the written statement by Lord Faulks QC, the Minister of State for Civil Justice on 26th 
February 2015. 
6 The announcement was made on 17th December 2015 by Lord Faulks QC, the Minister of State 
for Civil Justice and may be found at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2015-12-17/HCWS420/.  
7 Although a number of Parliamentary Written Questions were answered in terms which 
suggest the issue of insolvency litigation was considered in the Parliamentary LASPO Impact 
Assessment, there is no evidence that that was in fact the case (see for example, the answers to 
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Implementation Review of LASPO between April 2016 and April 2018, that Review again 
did not address the effect of the reforms specifically on insolvency litigation.8 
Independent research was published by the author in both 20149  and 201610. For an in-
depth consideration of the history of, and public policy considerations involved in, 
support for insolvency litigation, the reader is directed to the two previous reports.11 
The aim of both the 2014 and 2016 reports was to assist Government policy making by 
providing evidence as to how insolvency litigation was funded at that time and the 
likely effect that the Jackson Reforms would have on the market. The two reports 
recognised a developing third party funding market but considered the introduction of 
the Jackson Reforms to insolvency litigation would lead to a significant reduction in 
the funds brought into insolvent estates and distributed to creditors.  
The estimated value of insolvency claims brought under the pre-Jackson regime was 
likely to be around £1bn with approximately half of this figure finding its way back to 
insolvent estates to cover costs and be distributed to creditors.12 The value of the third 
party funding market was estimated as being approximately 10% of that figure.13  
The results of a survey of insolvency practitioners carried out in December 2015, just 
prior to the Jackson reforms taking effect on insolvency litigation, showed the 
following: 86% of respondents believed that less money would be returned to creditors 
as a result of the Jackson reforms; 49% stated they would stop or decrease the amount 
of insolvency litigation they would initiate; 54% said they would use third party funders 
to help fill the gap caused by the loss of recoverability of CFA uplifts and ATE insurance 
premiums.14 
The methodology of the previous two reports relied upon looking at data held by the 
Insolvency Service, a survey of the profession, a series of interviews with various 
                                                          
Written Questions 13344, 13345, 13342, 13343, 13333, 15406 provided by Dominic Raab MP, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Justice) in November 2015). 
8 See paragraph 1.2 of the Post-Implementation Review of Part 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing 




9 The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms on Insolvency Litigation – an Empirical 
Investigation commissioned by R3 (with the support of ACCA, ICAEW, ICAS, IPA, JLT Specialty 
Ltd, Moon Beever and Moore Stephens LLP) (“the 2014 Report”) which may be found on the R3 
website. 
10 Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms – An Update R3 (with the support of ACCA, 
ICAEW, ICAS, ILA, IPA, JLT Specialty Ltd, IRS and Willis Towers Watson) (“the 2016 Update”) 
which may be found on the R3 website. 
11 See Sections 3 and 4 of the 2014 Report and Section 3 of the 2016 Update. 
12 See the 2016 Update at 2.1B. 
13 See the 2016 Update at 2.2D. 
14 See Appendix B of the 2016 Update. 
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stakeholders and an analysis of data provided by the principal UK insolvency litigation 
funder, Manolete Partners plc. Due to changes made by sections 120 and 121 of the 
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, the requirement for any office-
holders to pursue the sanction of the Insolvency Service prior to taking legal action 
was abolished on 26th May 2015. The source of the Insolvency Service data used for the 
previous two reports therefore no longer exists. In an attempt to replicate the basic 
methodology, as far as possible, of the previous two reports, the current research relies 
upon a survey of the profession, an analysis of up-to-date data held by Manolete 
Partners plc and a series of stakeholder interviews. 
The next section provides an assessment of legal and practical issues affecting how 
insolvency practitioners address their duty to act in the best interests of creditors in 
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5 Insolvency Practitioner (“IP”) Duties when realising a Cause of Action 
5.1 The IP as a Fiduciary  
An IP is a fiduciary,15 a person who has undertaken to act for, or in the interests of, 
another and whose activities can be supervised in equity so as to prevent their being 
used for personal advantage.16 In Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew17 Millett LJ 
stated that:  
"The distinguishing feature of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The 
principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core 
liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make 
a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty 
and interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or for the benefit of 
a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not 
intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of 
fiduciary obligations”.  
In an insolvency context, the fiduciary duties owed by an IP include the duty to act 
bona fide within the IP’s powers and a duty to act in the best interests of the company’s 
creditors as a whole.18 
5.2 IPs and Remuneration 
An IP will normally seek to be remunerated and, as a fiduciary, can only claim 
remuneration which has been authorised.19 The IP will have to justify the claim. This is 
one aspect of a fiduciary’s obligation to account. Money retained by the IP out of the 
estate’s property is not available to the creditors. The IP must account for it by showing 
that he or she ought to be allowed to retain it. He or she must explain the nature of the 
tasks which have been undertaken and the reasons why they were carried out in that 
way as well as the amount of time and effort spent upon them. If an IP agrees with the 
insolvent estate’s creditors that he or she should be remunerated according to a 
percentage of realisations, and so in one sense, is funding the action through his or her 
own time, this does not constitute the IP a “commercial funder”.20 
5.3 Duty of Care to Creditors 
In addition to acting bona fide and within their powers, the actions of, and decisions 
made by, IPs will be judged according to the standard of the reasonable person acting 
in his or her own affairs. They are expected to display reasonable commercial 
                                                          
15 This was the starting point from which Ferris J developed his judgment in Mirror Group 
Newspapers plc v Maxwell (No 2) [1998] 1 BCLC 638. 
16 H Anderson, The Framework of Corporate Insolvency Law (Oxford, 2017) paras 11.08-11.12. 
17 [1998] Ch 1 at 18. 
18 BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA [2019] EWCA Civ 112. 
19 See Rules 18.15 to 18.38 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (SI 2016/1024). 
20 Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2019] EWHC 2995 (Ch) at [44]. 
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judgement21 and not act regardless of expense. Transactions which incur high costs 
will be subject to close scrutiny.  
An IP owes a duty to act with reasonable care and skill. In this regard the standard by 
which he or she is judged is the standard of a reasonably skilled and careful 
practitioner.22 If an IP decides to sell a company’s business or a particular asset, the IP 
owes a duty of care in relation to the choice of the time to sell and the taking of 
appropriate available valuation and marketing steps calculated to achieve the best 
price.23  
Allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and the duty of skill and care were upheld by the 
court in Brewer v Iqbal.24 The IP had breached his fiduciary duty by failing to act single-
mindedly for the company. He had failed to take account of matters which he should 
have taken into account whilst taking into account matters he should not have taken 
into account. He had failed in this duty to exercise reasonable skill and care with 
regard to marketing and valuing of the company’s assets.  
IPs may be in breach of duty if they fail to give proper consideration as to how they 
ought to exercise their discretionary powers. The court in Brewer recognised that, in 
certain circumstances, a failure to take professional advice will amount to a flawed 
decision-making process.25  
5.4 Duties of IPs when realising a Legal Cause of Action 
When an IP becomes aware of a possible cause of action capable of being pursued in 
order to benefit a company’s creditors, he or she has a wide discretion as to what to do. 
The IP will need to be familiar with the circumstances of the case. It will be important 
to consider whether the proposed defendant has sufficient wealth to satisfy any 
possible successful judgment. The IP will need to consider the likelihood of success of 
the action. The insolvent estate may have sufficient funds within it to finance an 
action (including the contingent cost of an indemnity for any personal liability 
incurred by the IP if the case is lost). In such cases, IPs may legitimately use those 
funds to take action, provided that they exercise proper commercial judgement, 
consider whether they would hazard their own money in the way planned and keep 
the costs under review to ensure that they are justified. On the other hand, and very 
much more commonly in an insolvent estate, it may be impecunious. Whether or not 
there is funding available in the insolvent estate, it will be important to consider the 
options available.26 They will usually include the following (or a combination of them): 
                                                          
21 Re T & D Industries plc [2000] 1 WLR 646. 
22 Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No.2) [1990] BCC 605. 
23 See e.g. Davey v Money [2018] EWHC 766 (Ch); [2018] Bus. L.R. 1903; Silven Properties Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2000] BCC 727. 
24 [2019] EWHC 182 (Ch); [2019] BCC 746. 
25 See Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26; [2013] 2 AC 108 which was followed in Brewer. 
26 The cost of issuing proceedings itself may be an issue especially where the estate is 
impecunious (see SI 2008/1053 Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008 (SI 2008/1053), Schedule 1 of 
which states the fee for commencing an action in the High Court or County Court where, for 
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i) do nothing; 
ii) ask creditors to fund the action; 
iii) fund the action themselves or get their IP firm to do so; 
iv) enter into a CFA with their legal team with or without ATE insurance; 
v) enter into a funding agreement or assignment of the proposed cause of 
action with a third party funder; or 
vi) enter into a damages based agreement.27 
 
If an IP is uncertain which course to follow, in many situations he or she may attempt to 
seek directions from the court but it would seem unlikely that the courts will help in this 
context. When there is a decision to be made by an IP which is essentially a commercial 
decision the IP will not be allowed to use the court “as a sort of bomb shelter”28. An IP, 
when acting as liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy no longer requires the consent of 
creditors (or the Insolvency Service) prior to taking legal action.29 The IP might be wise 
to take account of the views of the creditors prior to taking legal action or assigning a 
cause of action but ultimately he or she is responsible for how the discretionary power 
is exercised. 
Any course of action should be intended to lead to an advantage to the creditors. 
Whatever the IP decides to do it is plainly correct that the IP should take more account 
of the views of the creditors than the directors of the company.30 If the only advantage 
to the creditors is the indirect benefit that the IP’s fees will be covered, that would appear 
to fall short of what is required of the IP.31 
5.4.1 Do Nothing 
Although a number of IPs are risk averse, they must be aware that if they decide not to 
pursue the realisation of a cause of action, they may be failing in their duties to creditors 
unless they have made a documented, reasoned and reasonable decision not to pursue 
the claim. It is not open to an IP not to investigate potential causes of action. Where an 
IP has been appointed, effectively by those in control of a company, the IP must not 
                                                          
example, if the claim is for over £200,000, the fee is £10,000). It is not uncommon for IPs 
themselves to fund such fees out of their own money. 
27 There is no evidence that any IP has yet entered into a damages based agreement. There is 
perceived to be an insuperable conflict of interest facing lawyers who agree to such 
agreements. If a lawyer wishes to be benefit from a percentage of any proceeds of an action, 
there is the concern that the IP would not be acting in the best interests of the creditors by 
agreeing to such an agreement rather than a more conventional conditional fee agreement. 
Whatever the reasons for the widespread reluctance to adopt damages based agreements, they 
are not used in insolvency practice and so will not be considered further in this report. 
28 Re T & D Industries plc [2000] 1 WLR 646 at 657 per Neuberger J. 
29 See sections 120 and 121 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
Although a liquidator has always had the power to dispose of company property, which would 
include assignment of a company action, this power did not include office-holder actions until 
section 118 of the 2015 Act permitted assignment of such actions. 
30 Faryab v Smith [2001] BPIR 246 per Robert Walker LJ at [42]. 
31 Faryab v Smith per Judge LJ at [49]. 
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accept the opinions and views of directors but must exercise independent judgement in 
deciding what to do with a company’s assets.32  
An IP has a statutory duty to report on potential unfit conduct by directors under the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.33 If there is evidence of such misconduct, 
the IP must consider, and take appropriate advice, as to whether a cause of action is 
available against the directors, which may lead to some benefit to the company’s 
creditors. If an IP is aware that disqualification proceedings are to be taken against a 
director by the Secretary of State, the IP may wish to liaise with the Secretary of State’s 
team as to any likelihood that a compensation order under section 15A of the Company 
Directors Disqualification may be pursued. This may prove to be an efficient way to effect 
a return to the company’s creditors with little or no cost to the insolvent estate. 
If there is a possible cause of action but the IP is considering doing nothing about it, it 
would make sense for the IP to offer a full assignment of the action for a single one-off 
payment to a funder. Even if the funder passes on the offer, the IP will be able to 
demonstrate that a genuine attempt to realise its value has been made. 
5.4.2  Ask Creditors for Funding 
Although once commonplace, it has become reasonably rare in the past twenty years or 
so, for a creditor to fund insolvency litigation. It remains a possibility and an IP will 
usually approach the insolvent estate’s creditors to see if they are prepared to fund any 
proposed action. Most creditors are reluctant to risk further sums when they already 
stand to lose money in the insolvency. In a previous research report,34 it was suggested 
that the UK might consider adopting a version of the Australian system where creditors 
are rewarded with an increased return if they decide to fund insolvency litigation. It is 
difficult to understand the reluctance of the UK Government to consider the introduction 
of such a procedure.  
Prior to the abolition of the Crown’s preferential status by the Enterprise Act 2002, Crown 
creditors, such as the predecessors to HMRC were often willing to fund insolvency 
litigation. In recent years, HMRC has only supported financially a relatively small 
number of such cases (usually limited to cases involving allegations of fraud). It might 
be that with the imminent reintroduction of HMRC as a preferential creditor35 this may 
change. As the proceeds of most litigation will form part of the insolvent estate, HMRC, 
as a preferential creditor, is likely to be the primary recipient of any dividend. It would 
therefore make a great deal of sense for HMRC to return to its pre-Enterprise Act practice 
of routinely funding insolvency litigation. There is also the possibility of negotiating a 
“matched funding” agreement along with a commercial funder. 
                                                          
32 Brewer v Iqbal [2019] EWHC 182 (Ch); [2019] BCC 746. 
33 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, section 7A. 
34 See Section 5 of the 2016 Update. 
35 HMRC is due to regain its preferential status, at least for some taxation debts, from 1st 
December 2020 (see HM Treasury Budget 2020 Statement HC 121 March 2020 at paragraph 2.261 
- Protecting your taxes in insolvency. 
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It is possible that secured creditors may occasionally fund certain actions by IPs. The 
reintroduction of the Crown preference will most likely act as a deterrent to other 
unsecured creditors. Absent the adoption of a form of the Australian system of 
rewarding creditors who provide funding support, the lion’s share of any proceeds of any 
successful action are likely to go (after costs) to HMRC.  
5.4.3 IP Firm Funds the Action  
There appears to be a small number of IP firms who engage in funding insolvency 
actions being brought by their own IPs (that is IPs who are partners in or employed by 
those firms)36. There are some potential concerns and dangers in doing so, some of 
which are highlighted by the case of Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding.37 The court 
has a jurisdiction to award costs against a third party under s. 51 of the Senior Courts Act 
1981.38 The court looks to do what is just in the circumstances. It will generally not impose 
liability for costs on what are termed “pure funders”, which means those who have no 
interest in the litigation, who are not funding it as a matter of business and do not look 
to control the action. If the non-party to the action looks to exercise control over it or is 
to benefit from a successful conclusion, justice will usually require, in the event the 
action fails, that the non-party pays the successful side’s costs. It will be acting as a 
“commercial funder”. 39 
The principle applicable is that if an IP firm funds an action and looks to benefit from 
that funding, it will usually be ordered to pay adverse costs if the action is lost. In 
Burnden, the IP firm funded part of an action and, had it been successful, would have 
recouped approximately 2.25 times the funding provided. The court found it to be acting 
as a “commercial funder” and was therefore liable for a part of the adverse costs of the 
successful party.  
There is also a potential issue around conflict of interest and duty if an IP’s own firm acts 
as a funder for one of the IP’s actions. It would seem that an IP in such circumstances 
should consider obtaining offers from third party funders to ensure that the insolvent 
estate and its creditors are getting the best deal available in the market. 
If the basis for remuneration of an IP, in an impecunious insolvent estate, is a percentage 
of realisations, he or she is not, without more, constituted as a “commercial funder”.  
Similarly, if an IP firm (or solicitors’ firm) supports an action by relatively “low-level”40 
funding, which is limited in nature and common within the profession, such funding 
                                                          
36 The suggestion that an IP might make a payment as security for costs in an action was 
described by Marcus Smith J in Absolute Living Developments Limited (In Liquidation) v DS7 
Limited [2018] EWHC 1432 (Ch) at [33] as “entirely unusual” and the prospect of such payments 
being made as “theoretical or fanciful”. 
37 [2019] EWHC 2995 (Ch). 
38 For the general principles the court uses when considering exercising this jurisdiction see: 
Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807 (PC) at [25]. 
39 [2019] EWHC 2995 (Ch) at [6]. 
40 [2019] EWHC 2995 (Ch) at [47]. 
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support will not constitute the IP firm as a “commercial funder”. They will be seen as a 
“pure funder” and acting merely to facilitate access to justice for the insolvent estate.41 
5.4.4. CFA (with or without ATE) 
Since the Jackson Reforms were applied to insolvency litigation, any CFA uplift 
(commonly, but not invariably set at the maximum permissible100% of the lawyers’ base 
costs42) and ATE premium are no longer separately recoverable from a losing 
defendant.43 Such costs must be paid out of any damages awarded or settlement 
reached. 
The obvious risk from an IP’s viewpoint in such cases is that the recovery may not be 
sufficient to cover the legal team’s fees (and disbursements) and any ATE premium. The 
more complex or drawn-out a matter becomes the more likely these fees are to increase. 
Even in reasonably large claims the IP may find that there is little left for creditors once 
the legal team’s fees, the ATE premium and the IP’s own fees are paid. The IP must, based 
up the best advice available, make a professional judgement as to whether this mode of 
funding the action is likely to be in the best interests of the creditors. 
The IP needs to consider carefully the terms of any CFA (and ATE policy). In 
Stevensdrake Ltd (t/a Stevensdrake Solicitors) v Hunt44 a claim was successfully settled 
for a sum of £1.9m which would have been more than sufficient to cover legal costs (and 
the CFA uplift). The money was never recovered as the defendant became bankrupt. The 
terms of the CFA expressly provided for the IP to be personally liable for the legal costs 
(and uplift) if the action were a success. Under the terms of the CFA, the action had been 
a success even though no recovery had been made. The liability to pay was not limited 
by reference to funds available in the liquidation. The CFA imposed personal liability to 
pay the legal fees on the IP regardless of actual recoveries. 
The case highlights a real risk for IPs. It suggests an IP needs to read carefully and fully 
understand the terms of a CFA (and indeed an ATE policy). It would appear wise for IPs 
in such cases to take independent legal advice on their potential personal liability. It 
would not always be sensible to rely upon any advice as to the effect of any CFA contract 
which is provided by the legal team with whom the CFA is being entered. That legal team 
is not in a position to provide independent advice on the terms of the CFA. If the IP has 
not fully understood the implications of the CFA’s terms, it seems it would be arguable 
                                                          
41 [2019] EWHC 2995 (Ch) at [41]. 
42 See paragraph 3 of the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 2013 (SI 2013/689) which limits the 
percentage uplift legally possible under section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 to 
100%. 
43 See paragraph 2 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(Commencement No 12) Order 2016 (SI 2016/345) which came into force 6th April 2016 and 
brought litigation by administrators, liquidators and trustees in bankruptcy within the 
limitations of sections 44 and 46 of LASPO 2012. 
44 [2017] EWCA Civ 1173; [2017] BCC 611. 
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that the legal team has breached its duty to the IP by not fully explaining its terms and 
its practical implications.45 
ATE insurance is commonly purchased by IPs (and funders) when taking legal action of 
any significance. It has been stated judicially that unless there is evidence to the 
contrary, a properly drafted ATE policy provided by a substantial and reputable insurer 
will be seen by the courts as a reliable source to satisfy any application for security of 
costs.46 Despite this general approach, the court has recently commented, in Rowe v 
Ingenious Media Holdings plc,47 that an ATE policy with a number of exclusions 
contained within it may not be seen as adequate security for costs. As Nugee J 
commented: 
“The fundamental difficulty is that an ATE policy, as recognised on both sides, is 
not designed as security for costs.  It is designed as cover for the Claimants, and 
like all insurance, insurers are astute to protect themselves from behaviour of the 
insured which changes the risk they have agreed to undertake… I suspect the 
problems that have been identified could be solved, and there may be something 
to be said for litigation funders and ATE insurers to seek to develop a form of 
policy that could both act as insurance for claimants and sufficient protection for 
defendants.”48  
A funder with the benefit of such an ATE policy may still need to provide sufficient 
assets to cover an order for security of costs. It would appear sensible for an IP to 
consider closely the terms of any ATE policy and negotiate terms which will do what the 
IP needs it to do.49 
The decision to instruct solicitors and counsel is simply a decision to sub-contract work 
which IPs are entitled and (at least in theory) able to do themselves. In Jacob v UIC 
Insurance Co Ltd50 the court explained that whenever IPs chose to retain their own firms 
for work in an insolvency procedure they ought to negotiate the best rates possible. IPs 
must look to achieve the best value for the creditors. This principle must also apply to 
any decision as to how to take legal proceedings. It would cover any decision to instruct 
a legal team. It would similarly cover any decision to engage with third party funders. 
The IP must decide which route would bring best value to the estate. 
                                                          
45 LF2 Ltd v Supperstone [2018] EWHC 1776 (Ch); [2019] 1 BCLC 38 at [46]. 
46 Under CPR 25.12 and 25.13. See Geophysical Service Centre Co v Dowell Schlumberger (ME) Inc 
[2013] EWCH 147 (TCC) at [15] and Premier Motorauctions Ltd v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2017] 
EWCA Civ 1872; 2018 1 WLR 2955 at [31]. A court will be alive to the possibility of an anti-
avoidance clause which permits the insurer to avoid the insurance contract on the basis of non-
disclosure or misrepresentation. 
47 [2020] EWHC 235 (Ch). To similar effect see the comments made by the court in Re Hotel 
Portfolio II UK Ltd [2020] EWHC 233 (Comm). 
48 [2020] EWHC 235 (Ch) at [136 -138]. 
49 See the commentary in A Jay “Recent developments in litigation funding” (2019) 6 Corporate 
Rescue and Insolvency 218.  
50 [2006] EWHC 2717. 
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The IP must decide which funding model (or combination thereof) to adopt as well as 
negotiate appropriate terms. This may involve considering the percentage uplift on any 
CFA and any percentage of realisations to be retained by a funder. In reaching that 
decision, the IP must consider whether there is the need to test the market. The IP must 
be able to support with reasons the decision made if it is later questioned. The IP must 
decide what to do with the IP’s fiduciary obligations firmly in mind. 
5.4.5 Engaging with a Funder or Assignee 
Decisions facing an IP are generally left to the commercial judgement of the IP.51 In the 
context of assigning a cause of action the Court of Appeal, in Faryab v Smith52 has 
observed that:  
“the realisation of a cause of action (especially a cause of action of some 
complexity) is … less obviously a matter for business common sense than the 
realisation of more conventional assets such as freehold or leasehold property, 
stock in trade or other tangible moveable property.”53  
In the same case, the Court of Appeal described decisions, based upon the strength or 
otherwise of a legal cause of action, made by an IP who was not a lawyer as “most 
unsatisfactory”54.  
The Court of Appeal also commented on the facts, that it was not “wholly immaterial” 
that the amount received for the assignment of the action coincided with the IP’s 
estimate as to his likely fees and expenses. Although not making any imputation 
against the IP, the Court of Appeal did recognise that “his natural concern about his 
own position must have played some part in the decision-making process”55. The court 
does have jurisdiction to intervene in cases where IPs have reached decisions in good 
faith but where they had “not followed a satisfactory decision-making process and had 
not reached a satisfactory decision.”56 In deciding whether, and on what terms, to 
assign a cause of action (or engage a funder), an IP must take professional legal advice. 
Once the IP has received advice on the strengths and weaknesses of the claim, the IP 
must still exercise his or her independent judgement as whether to take any action and 
if the decision is to take action, the IP must then decide how best to realise the claim. 
                                                          
51 See the discussion in LF2 Ltd v Supperstone [2018] EWHC 1776 (Ch); [2019] 1 BCLC 38 at [55] as 
to whether an IP ought not to assign a claim where the action by the assignee might be one 
which the IP believed to be frivolous or vexatious.  
52 [2001] BPIR 246. 
53 Faryab v Smith per Robert Walker LJ at [32]. 
54 Faryab v Smith per Robert Walker LJ at [38]. 
55 Faryab v Smith per Robert Walker LJ at [39]. 
56 Faryab v Smith per Robert Walker KJ at [45] 
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One obvious comparator when considering an assignment of an action to a 
commercial funder would be to investigate how much, if anything, the prospective 
defendant would be willing to pay for the cause of action.57 
Whenever an IP is aware of the potential value of a cause of action, he or she must act 
to obtain a proper payment for any assignment of the action. If the value of the action 
is not clear, the IP ought to consider some process of inviting rival bids or to hold an 
auction of the cause of action. Money received will benefit either the creditors directly, 
if there is an eventual dividend paid, or indirectly, by enabling (at least part of) the 
expenses of the IP to be met.58 
The position would appear to be similar where engagement with a funder does not lead 
to an assignment of the cause of action but instead allows for funding to be provided to 
the IP to enable the IP to pursue the action.59 
One clearly significant difference between on the one hand funding being provided 
and on the other, an outright assignment of the action, is that in the latter, the IP loses 
control of the action. Depending upon the terms agreed with a funder, the action may 
be settled quickly by an assignee funder, in circumstances where an IP may have 
wished to continue the action with the aim of a greater return in the longer term. The 
loss of control, speed of resolution60 and probability of success, are all matters, along 
with the actual financial figures agreed, an IP will need to take into account prior to 
agreeing terms with a funder. 
Another potentially significant problem for a funder is the possibility that if its services 
fall within the terms of the Damages Based Agreements Regulations 2013, the court 
may find that the agreement with the IP does not comply with those Regulations and 
decide, on that basis that the whole agreement is also champtertous at common law.61 
                                                          
57 Faryab v Smith is an example of such an assignment being made albeit in the absence of 
appropriate legal advice. An IP needs also to satisfy the provisions of Statement of Insolvency 
Practice 13 if a cause of action is assigned to a person connected with the company or debtor. In 
such cases, the IP needs to demonstrate that he or she has acted with due regard to creditors’ 
interests by providing creditors with a proportionate and sufficiently detailed justification of 
why a sale to a connected party was undertaken, including the alternatives considered. 
58 LF2 Ltd v Supperstone [2018] EWHC 1776 (Ch); [2019] 1 BCLC 38 at [67]. 
59 IPs should be careful to avoid engaging the support of a funder which might breach the terms 
of the Damages Based Agreements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/609) for which see Meadowside 
Building, Developments Ltd (In Liquidation) v 12-18 Hill Street Management Company Ltd [2019] 
EWHC 2651 (TCC). 
60 On the issue of speed of resolution, an IP may need to consider whether or not a cause of 
action qualifies for hearing under the Insolvency Express Trials Practice Direction 9IET) (CPR 
PD 51P) came into force which sets the detail for a new pilot scheme known as Insolvency 
Express Trials (IET). The IET pilot scheme will now end on 6 April 2020. Its intention is to 
provide insolvency litigants with a speedy, streamlined procedure and an early date for trial or 
disposal where the application is simple. 
61 Meadowside Building, Developments Ltd (In Liquidation) v 12-18 Hill Street Management 
Company Ltd [2019] EWHC 2651 (TCC) at [114]. 
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5.4.5.1 Funders’ liability  
It is clearly important that the terms upon which a funding agreement is agreed 
considers what happens both where the action is successful and where it fails. If it 
fails, a “commercial funder” will need to understand the extent of its liability for 
adverse costs. It may self-insure these costs or purchase appropriate ATE insurance. 
The court may ask for evidence that a commercial funder has sufficient assets to cover 
any adverse costs. If such evidence is not forthcoming, the court is likely to order 
security for costs against the IP or the funder.62 If the funding agreement is found to be 
champertous, the funder’s liability for adverse costs will be unlimited.63 
In general terms, the court wishes to ensure that funders are not dissuaded from 
funding actions but also that successful defendants have the ability to recover at least 
part of their costs where an impecunious claimant’s action has failed. There are two 
factors or approaches to assessing a funder’s liability for adverse costs that the court 
will take into account in ensuring its decision achieves a just result.  
The court may limit a commercial funder’s liability for adverse costs: 1) to the amount 
of the funder’s contribution – the so-called Arkin64 Cap; and 2) to the costs incurred by 
the winning party during the period when the funder had acted as such.65 Funders 
should be aware that the Arkin Cap is not a rule but an approach which the court ought 
to consider in reaching a just result. The approach was determinative in the Burnden 
case but for a number of reasons was not followed in Davey v Money66 (upheld on 
appeal67).The fact that each case will turn on its individual circumstances creates an 
uncertainty for funders in attempting to predict the likely sum of any security for costs 
which may be ordered.  
 
 
                                                          
62 Re RBS Rights Issue Litigation [2017] EWHC 1217 (Ch); [2017] 1 WLR 4635 and Re Hotel Portfolio 
II UK Ltd [2020] EWHC 233 (Comm). 
63 Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos 2 & 3) [2005] 1 WLR 3055 at [40]. 
64  Named after the case Arkin v Borchard Lines Ltd (Nos 2 & 3) [2005] 1 WLR 3055. 
65 Burnden Holdings (UK) Ltd v Fielding [2019] EWHC 2995 (Ch) at [8] – [11]. 
66 Davey v Money [2019] EWHC 997 (Ch); [2019] 1 W.L.R. 6108 at [48] – [111] and summarised in 
Burden at [16] in the following terms: “i) The funder had approached its involvement throughout 
as a commercial investment. ii)  The litigation was sufficiently out of the norm to warrant the 
making of an indemnity costs award against the claimant. While the funder had not itself 
directed the way the case was conducted, it had sufficient opportunity to investigate and form a 
view as to the nature of the claim and the support for the allegations being made before 
choosing to fund it. iii)  The funder must have known that the claimant was most unlikely to be 
able to pay any substantial costs awarded against her. iv) The funder had halved its 
commitment to funding but retained the same potential share of recoveries, which highlighted 
the commercial self-interest motivating it. v)  The funder had negotiated to receive a substantial 
commercial profit which would have taken priority over any compensation payable to the 
claimant. 
67 Chapelgate Credit Opportunity Master Fund Limited v Money [2020] EWCA Civ 246. 
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5.4.5.2 Security for Costs 
As is well understood, insolvency litigation has a number of characteristics which may 
distinguish it from other civil litigation. If an IP decides to take legal action, the 
defendant will often ask the court to order security for the defendant’s costs against 
the insolvent estate represented by the IP. It is, of course, possible that an insolvent 
company will have sufficient assets available to cover that security68 but in many cases 
the company will be impecunious or at least unable to meet an order for adverse costs. 
Under CPR 25.12 and 25.13, the court may order security for costs if there is reason to 
believe the company will be unable to pay the defendant’s costs if ordered to do so.69  
In such cases, the IP may argue that any order for security of costs will unfairly stifle 
the claim. In order to convince the court that the action would be stifled, the IP must 
put evidence before the court as to the company’s means and must satisfy the court, to 
a standard of probability, that an order for security of costs would stifle the action. The 
court will assess the claimant’s ability to provide security by looking at the company’s 
assets but will also likely consider whether such security might be expected from third 
parties such as creditors, shareholders, associated companies, ATE insurers or third 
party funders. The burden is on the IP to provide evidence as to whether such security 
is likely or unlikely to be available from such sources.70 Although the support of an ATE 
insurer or funder is often deemed essential by an IP in such cases, it should be borne in 
mind that the court will not order security for costs if there are good reasons why there 
is no-one in the background who can provide such security.71 Equally, unless the court 
is convinced that ATE insurance or the capital value of the funder in question is a 
reliable source to cover any adverse costs, an order for security for costs will still be 
made.72 
There is therefore much to be said for an IP conducting due diligence into how its 
proposed funder operates. If there is a lack of transparency about the funder’s capital 
value it will not be capable of “self-insuring” and will usually need to take out ATE 
insurance to cover possible adverse costs. The ATE premium will add a cost to the 
action, and unless its terms have been negotiated carefully, may not survive an 
application for security for costs. 
 
                                                          
68 Adverse costs will normally be paid as an expense in the administration or liquidation – see 
rules 3.51 and 7.108 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 (SI 2016/1024). 
69 An order for security for costs is to be seen as a weapon to be used by a defendant to obtain 
swift summary judgment. It is intended to provide the claimant with options, that is, a choice as 
to whether to provide the security ordered or to discontinue the claim (Prince Radu of 
Hohenzollern v Houston [2006] EWCA Civ 1575 at [18]). 
70 Burnden Holdings UK Ltd v Fielding [2017] EWHC 2118 (Ch) at [87- 92] citing amongst other 
authorities, Brimko Holdings v Eastman Kodak Company [2004] EWHC 1343 (Ch) at [11]. 
71 For an example where the court refused to order security of costs in the sum of £500,000 
against a company in liquidation, as such an order would stifle the claim, see Absolute Living 
Developments Limited (In Liquidation) v DS7 Limited [2018] EWHC 1432 (Ch). 
72 Re Hotel Portfolio II UK Ltd [2020] EWHC 233 (Comm). 
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5.4.6 Damages Based Agreement (“DBA”) 
A DBA allows for a fully contingent fee in that lawyers (or others providing services to 
IPs) may agree to receive a percentage of any damages awarded (subject to a cap of 50% 
of damages paid)73. There are concerns from lawyers that the very prescriptive 
requirements for DBAs, with the consequence of non-compliance being that they are 
unenforceable, have put many off using DBAs. There is also perceived by some lawyers 
to be an insuperable conflict of interest facing lawyers who agree to such agreements. 
If a lawyer wishes to benefit from a percentage of any proceeds of an action, there is 
the concern that the IP would not be acting in the best interests of the creditors by 
agreeing to such an agreement rather than a more conventional CFA.  
There is some interest in the possibility of a future hybrid form of DBA, whereby in any 
event, lawyers would be able to recover a maximum of 30% of their costs. This may 
prove attractive to IPs and their lawyers in future if such a partial or hybrid DBA 
becomes legally possible. A recent independent review74 of DBAs may still breathe life 
into the DBA concept.  
Whatever the reasons for the widespread reluctance to adopt DBAs, there is little 
evidence that they are used in insolvency practice. In the small number of cases where 
they have been used successfully, there remains anecdotal evidence that they may not 
have been fully compliant with legislative provisions, and so, may have been found to 
be unenforceable if the point had been pursued. It may be that DBAs become more 
popular in the future but legislative change would appear to be necessary for them to 









                                                          
73 See in general section 58AA of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 and the Damages Based 
Agreements Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/609). 
74 The DBA Reform Project 2019 was carried out at the request of the Ministry of Justice by 
Nicholas Bacon QC and Professor Rachael Mulheron of Queen Mary University London. The 
project report and related documentation may be found at: 
https://www.qmul.ac.uk/law/research/impact/dbarp/. 
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5.5 What Should an IP do? 
It is clear that the decision facing an IP as to how to realise the value of a cause of action 
is often “nuanced and difficult”75. It would seem from the above discussion that IPs need 
to have in mind the following fundamental propositions when contemplating litigation: 
(a) The fiduciary nature of their duties.   
(b) They must therefore act in what they believe to be the best interests of the 
creditors. 
(c) They must keep proper records of their decision-making processes so as to be 
able to account for expenditure made.76 
(d) They must ensure that both their time costs and any costs such as legal costs are 
best value for money. 
(e) They are expected to exercise proper commercial judgment when realising any 
asset but when realising a cause of action they will need to take legal advice. 
(f) The whole range of funding options must be considered and a judgement must 
be made as to which is in the best interests of the creditors, not merely which is most 
likely to ensure the payment of the IPs’ fees. 
(g) It may be necessary to approach a number of funders or assignees in order to 
ensure the IP can be seen to be taking reasonable care to act in the best interests 
of creditors. 
(h) IPs must recognise the risks inherent in different funding options. 
In the next section, the views of IPs who responded to an online survey will be 
considered, data kindly made available by Manolete Partners plc will also be analysed, 
along with the opinions of a number of other stakeholders who were interviewed in order 
to assess, amongst other things, whether IPs are following these guidelines. A summary 
of the main findings will be made. Where there are areas which might benefit from 
improvement, the final section will consider changes which might be considered by the 




                                                          
75 Absolute Living Developments Limited (In Liquidation) v DS7 Limited [2018] EWHC 1432 (Ch) at 
[33]. 
76 The provisions of Statement of Insolvency Practice 2 must be satisfied in this regard. 
Page 21 of 61 
 
6  Empirical Evidence 
An online survey was open from September 2019 to February 2020. Another source of 
empirical data was kindly provided by Manolete Partners plc who kindly made 
available data on the cases which were put forward for its consideration during 2019 as 
well as details of all of its historic cases. In order to give context and some detailed 
commentary on current practice a number of interviews were conducted with 
practitioners and other stakeholders between October 2019 and February 2020. These 
different sources of data are considered below. 
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6.1  Survey Data 
In the following discussion, each question contained within the online survey is 
presented along with an explanation and analysis of the answers provided. 
Question 1  
 
None 50.87% 88 






The survey was addressed to IPs but a small number of other stakeholders, mostly 
lawyers, also answered the questions. There was a final total of 173 respondents. 
Approximately 150 of these respondents were IPs or were otherwise responding on 
behalf of IPs. 
Although there are currently 1,553 licensed IPs,77 anecdotal evidence suggests that not 
all of these IPs actually take appointments (or take appointments which commonly 
involve insolvency litigation). In the two previous research reports in 2014 and 2016, 
calculations were based upon an estimate that there were approximately 450 such 
active appointment takers. For the purposes of this report, and to enable comparisons 
to be drawn with the data from the previous reports, it is assumed that there are still 
approximately 450 active appointment taking IPs. It is appreciated that the figures 
                                                          
77 My thanks to Bob Pinder of the ICAEW who kindly provided this figure. Of the 1,553 IPs 
licensed as at 1st January 2020, 1,236 are appointment-taking. The figure of 1,236 is made up of 
610 IPs licensed by the ICAEW, 514 by the IPA, 72 by the ICAS and 40 by CAI. 









In the last 12 months how many insolvency actions 
have you undertaken using a CFA?
Responses
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produced may therefore be very conservative when assessing the size of the 
insolvency litigation market. 
If one accepts that there are likely to be 450 current appointment taking IPs, the 
response rate to the survey of approximately 40% of that number is very encouraging. I 
would like to express my gratitude for the support the survey received from the ICAEW, 
the IPA and particularly Manolete Partners plc who pledged £5,000 to Great Ormond 
Street Children’s Hospital dependent upon a healthy survey response rate from the 
profession. My thanks to all concerned. 
Of the 85 respondents who answered that they had used a CFA in the past 12 months, 
the total number of actions specified was 656. This leads to an average of 7.72 actions 
per IP using a CFA in the previous year. 
Question 2 
 
Answer Choices Responses 
None 30.51% 19 
Please enter your answer in pounds sterling (£) omitting commas 69.49% 40  
Answered 59  
Skipped 114 
 
Although 85 respondents had answered Question 1 that they had used a CFA in the 
previous 12 months, only 59 answered Question 2 which asked for details about those 
actions.  
Of the 59 who answered, 19 who had identified a total of 61 actions using a CFA 
answered that there had been no net contribution made to the insolvent estates 
involved, once fees and costs had been paid.  
None Please enter your answer in pounds






Looking back at your individual caseload, 
approximately how much value (in total) in the last 12 
months was brought back into insolvent estates with 
which you are involved, NET of CFA and ATE costs, 
by using CFA-backed litigation?
Responses
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The 40 respondents who had experienced a net gain by the use of CFAs accounted for a 
total number of 298 actions which had contributed a net total figure of £43,681,557.  
The average net return per claim is therefore £121,675.65 per action. 
It is likely that the costs and fees which were paid before the net return to the estate, 
were for a similar figure. In other words, the total sum recovered by the action was 
likely to be double the net return figure. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the 
average case recovered from the defendant in total approximately £250,000.  
If one factors in the 26 respondents who had used a CFA in the previous 12 months but 
did not provide details of their net recoveries, those 26 represent a further 297 actions. 
If one extrapolates those actions at the average rate per claim above (£121,675.65), one 
gets a further likely total of net recoveries of £36,137,668. 
This leads to a likely total £79,819,225 of net value brought into insolvent estates by the 
85 respondents who had used a CFA in the previous 12 months. If this figure is 
recognised as representing 40% of the IP appointment taking profession, the figure 
suggests a total net figure of approximately £200m being brought into insolvent estates 
by the use of CFAs. 
Although each case turns upon its own facts, as mentioned above, it is widely believed 
that on average approximately half of any actual recoveries using CFA-based litigation, 
finds its way back to the estate net of costs. The above calculation would therefore 
suggest a total annual recovery of £400m by use of CFAs in insolvency litigation. 
Again, it is also widely recognised that the amount recovered from defendants 
averages out at approximately 50% of the initial amount claimed in the action. A 
further extrapolation might therefore be made that claims initially valued at 
approximately £800m are actioned per annum in insolvency litigation using CFAs.78 
Although this method of straight line extrapolation is arguably open to criticism, it is 
effectively the same method as used in both the 2014 and 2016 reports. In 2016, it was 
estimated that, prior to the Jackson Reforms, claims worth approximately £1bn were 
pursued using CFAs.79 When comparing the figure of £1bn from 2016 with the reduced 
£800m from 2019, it is suggested that the value of insolvency claims being pursued 
using CFAs has decreased following the Jackson Reforms by approximately 20%.  
This result is not entirely consistent with the opinions expressed in 2015, that 
approximately half of IPs intended to take action in fewer cases due to the Jackson 
Reforms80 but it perhaps sits more comfortably with the answers to Question 12 below 
                                                          
78If one extrapolates based upon the total number of appointment-taking IPs, 1,236, the total 
figure is likely to be 2.5 times this figure, approximately £2bn.  
79 See Section 2.2 of the 2016 Update. 
80 See Appendix B of the 2016 Update. 
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where only 16% of respondents stated that they have stopped or decreased the amount 
of litigation work following the Jackson Reforms. 
 Question 3  
  
Answer Choices Responses 
I have not come across cases where the use of a CFA would be 
appropriate 
42.86% 30 
I use third party funders or assignments of actions instead 25.71% 18 
Creditors were not in support of the action 1.43% 1 
Creditors were not in support due to likely reduced return 1.43% 1 
Lawyers were approached to act on a CFA basis but had 
declined to act 
14.29% 10 
The amount of money was too low to warrant action 27.14% 19 
The loss of the Insolvency Exemption has made the use of a 
CFA unattractive 
15.71% 11 
The risk was too great 30.00% 21 
Other (please specify) 12.86% 9  














Which of the reasons listed below explain why you 
have not pursued any insolvency litigation using a 
CFA in the past 12 months? Please select all that 
apply
Responses
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Of the 88 respondents who had not used a CFA in the previous 12 months, 70 provided 
reasons. Although a large minority had not come across appropriate cases, it is 
interesting to note that a quarter of those who answered explained that they now used 
funders or assignments instead of CFAs. This suggests that a proportion of the 
profession has decided that using third party funders or assignees is their default 
position for certain types of claim which would previously (before the Jackson 
Reforms) have been actioned using a CFA. 
It is also interesting to note that over a quarter regarded the amount of money as too 
low to warrant action. This would have been less of a concern prior to the Jackson 
Reforms and is suggestive that those Reforms have had a significant impact on IPs’ 
ability to bring relatively small claims. 
It is possible that these two groups of responses are related in that it may be that 
relatively small value claims are no longer viewed as realistic for IPs to pursue 
themselves but that they may still be attractive to funders or assignees. 
Question 4 
 
In the last 12 months how many claims have you undertaken using either a third 
party funder or assigning an action to a funder? 
Answer Choices Responses 
          
None 65.04% 80 
          
Please state how many 34.96% 43 
          
 
Answered 123 
          
 
Skipped 50 
          
 









In the last 12 months how many claims 
have you undertaken using either a third 
party funder or assigning an action to a 
funder?
Responses
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Only 43 of respondents had used a third party funder or assignee in the previous 12 
months. This is almost half of the number of IPs who had used a CFA. Of those who had 
used a funder or assignee, 26 had also used CFAs (in significant numbers – in total 
those 26 had taken 177 CFA-backed actions bringing in a net figure of £38,160,000). This 
suggests a reasonable number of IPs are considering their options and using either a 
CFA or funders depending upon the facts of each case. 
The total number of actions taken by the 43 respondents who answered this question 
positively was 206 with an average of 4.8 actions per IP. Interestingly, less than a 
handful of respondents accounted for just over half of the actions taken in this way. 
Nearly half of the 43 (19) had used funding or assignment in only a single case. 
There are some IPs whose practice is very litigious in nature and they appear to be 
using the full array of funding options available to them. Some IPs are beginning to use 
funders whilst others have yet to do so (or at least did not do so in the previous 12 
months). 
Question 5  Which third party funders or assignees have you used in the last 12 
months?  
Only 40 respondents answered this question. Those mentioned included Manolete (27 
times), Harbour (2), Henderson and Jones (2) and the following were all mentioned 
once: AB Insolvency, Acasta, Amtrust, Apex, Augusta, Benchwalk, Burford, Cavendish, 
CCH, Escalate, IMF, LCM, Therium, Vannin, shareholder, secured creditor. 
A number of respondents did not wish to disclose which funders they had used and 
some intimated that there were some IP firms and solicitors’ firms operating as third 
party funders. 
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Question 6  
 
Answer Choices Responses 
 
None 47.50% 19 
 











The 21 IPs who answered this question had taken action in 148 cases bringing in a net 
figure of £72,767,500 at an average of £491,672.30 per action. As explained above, most 
IPs who used funders also used CFAs to some extent. For most IPs it therefore appears 
that it is not a question of either CFAs or funders but of choosing the most appropriate 
mechanism for a particular case. 
The answers to this question, when compared to the answers to Question 2 above, 
suggest that funders tend to be used in bigger value cases. Smaller cases are more 
likely to continue to use (often informal) CFAs with or without ATE cover. 
The total net figure of nearly £73m is notable. It is not far behind the likely figure of 
approximately £80m for CFA-backed litigation considered above at Question 2. It 
suggests that the use of funding is fast catching up the use of CFAs. 
If one uses the same method of extrapolation as used at Question 2, with the net figure 
being regarded as representing 40% of the total appointment taking IPs, a total net 
recovery of £180m for the year is likely. If this is accepted as being approximately half 
None Please enter your answer in pounds
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of the amount actually recovered by the actions, prior to the payment of fees and costs, 
the total recovered from such action would be £360m. Again, using the same method as 
for Question 2, this might be seen as realising claims initially valued at £720m.81  
A note of caution must be sounded at this stage. Although the survey was completed by 
a significant number of IPs, it is entirely possible that predominantly only those IPs 
who have an interest in the use of funders found the time to complete the survey. It is 
possible that the extrapolation made therefore overstates the extent to which funding 
is being used.  
Taken at face value, the figures do suggest that the profession has increased 
significantly the use of funding and assignments from 2015 (before the Jackson 
Reforms) where total claims being pursued by funding or assignments was likely to be 
in the region of £50m.82 The market has clearly expanded significantly. 
  
                                                          
81 If one extrapolates based upon the total number of appointment-taking IPs, 1,236, the total 
figure is likely to be nearer £1.8bn. 
82 See the 2016 Update at 2.2D. 
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Question 7  
 
 
Which of the reasons listed below explain why you have not pursued any 
insolvency litigation using a third party funder or assignment of actions in the past 
12 months? Please select all that apply 
Answer Choices Responses 
I haven’t come across cases where the use of a third party funder or 
assignment of action would be appropriate 
53.95% 41 
I use CFAs instead 27.63% 21 
Creditors were not in support of the action 0.00% 0 
Creditors were not in support due to likely reduced return 1.32% 1 
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The amount of money was too low for a third party funder or 
assignee to be interested 
27.63% 21 
The risk was too great 7.89% 6 
Other (please specify) 6.58% 5  
Answered 76  
Skipped 97 
 
Over half of the respondents gave as the main reason why they had not used third 
party funders or assignments the fact that they had not come across any suitable case. 
Interestingly, over a quarter stated that they used CFAs instead, which suggests for 
some IPs, that the issue of how to fund an action is a binary decision and the only 
answer is to use a CFA. It may be that such IPs use CFAs only because the type of case 
they encounter is always more sensibly pursued using a CFA perhaps due to its being 
for a relatively small amount. The same proportion of respondents who stated they 
used CFAs also believed the amount of money involved in their case load was too low 
for a funder to be interested. About a quarter of respondents chose the two (possibly 
related answers) that the amount of money was too low to interest a funder or that a 
funder had been approached but had declined to take up the case. 
Question 8 Do you believe any particular funding method is best suited to 
compliance with the duties owed by an office-holder?  
A total of 77 respondents answered this question with 29 providing further narrative 
answers which were capable of categorisation. Of the 29, 12 were in favour of using 
funders or assignment of actions, 8 favoured the use of CFAs (either with or without 
ATE insurance), 2 would like to see a version of the Australian system adopted in the 
UK, 2 favoured creditors providing support and 5 stated that it always depends upon 
the facts of the individual case. 
Other comments included votes of confidence in the business model of two funders in 
particular. One respondent commented that all forms of funding were seen as leading 
to some loss of control. One respondent felt that funding was only used where the 
claim was for over £20m. One respondent claimed that not all IPs consider all the 
options available to them with the consequence that they might not be able to show 
they are taking steps to ensure the best return to creditors is made. 
  




In your experience, which model is most effective in bringing about a swift, 
commercial resolution to an insolvency claim? Please select one answer 
Answer Choices Responses 
CFA/ATE 35.71% 30 
Damages Based Agreement 4.76% 4 
Third Party Funding/Assignment 50.00% 42 
Other (please specify) 21.43% 18  
Answered 84  
Skipped 89 
 
The answers to this question suggest that half of respondents see the use of funders as 
most likely to lead to a swift commercial resolution to an insolvency claim although 
over a third favours the use of CFAs and ATE. There was no real pattern to the other 
answers provided. No details were provided by those who favoured the use of DBAs 
(two of the respondents who chose DBAs were solicitors not IPs). The answers do 
suggest that the abolition of recoverability by the Jackson Reforms has reduced the 
impact upon defendants of using CFAs and ATE. It would appear that a larger number 
of IPs now see the pressure brought by the use of a funder is more likely to encourage 
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Question 10 Before starting a legal action do you consider all the ways in which it 
might be funded before instructing solicitors?  
Of the 80 respondents who answered this question, nearly all said yes but a very small 
minority stated no. Some expanded upon their answer in the negative by explaining 
they did not consider funding options until they had initial advice or followed legal 
advice on funding. Overwhelmingly, IPs said they did consider all possible funding 
options although one said his or her belief was that many IPs did not do so. 
Question 11  
 
What are the factors you take into account when deciding how to fund a legal 
action? Please select all that apply 
Answer Choices Responses 
Using known/trusted lawyers 71.76% 61 
Maximising the return to creditors 87.06% 74 
Maximising fees 14.12% 12 
Speed of getting the case to trial or settlement 58.82% 50 
Speed of closing insolvency procedure 22.35% 19 
How you would fund if you were paying out of your own pocket 29.41% 25 
The possibility of funding giving rise to a conflict of interest 23.53% 20 
My personal risk 54.12% 46 
Securing an indemnity against adverse costs 69.41% 59 
Other (please specify) 5.88% 5  
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It is perhaps reassuring that the most popular answer to this question was “Maximising 
the return to creditors”. The next two most popular answers were using trusted lawyers 
and securing an indemnity for adverse costs. The adverse costs concern is certainly 
extremely understandable and again it is reassuring that legal advice from trusted 
lawyers is such a popular answer. It suggests that lawyers’ advice is being sought and 
followed in such cases. This is consistent with the fiduciary duty of an IP discussed 
above in Part 5. Speed of getting to trial or settlement was the next popular answer 
followed by an IP recognising the fiduciary duty to consider expending funds in the 
same manner as if they were the funds of the IP. Maximising fees was a minority 
answer but still relatively popular. The “other” category contained comments about the 
difficulty of finding funding from creditors such as HMRC. 
Question 12 
 
Since the Insolvency Exemption to the Jackson reforms ended in April 2016 have 
you? Please select all that apply 
Answer Choices Responses 
Stopped or decreased the amount of litigation work carried out 16.47% 14 
Refused or decreased the number of cases taken on where there are 
few or no assets available to fund litigation 
15.29% 13 
Started to use third party funders 28.24% 24 
Increased the use of third party funders 29.41% 25 
Used Damages Based Agreements to fund litigation 2.35% 2 
Carried on as before using CFAs 36.47% 31 
Other (please specify) 15.29% 13  
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The answers to this question show that, due to the Jackson Reforms, a significant 
number of IPs have started to use funders (28%) or increased their use of funders (29%) 
although over a third have continued as before using CFAs and ATE. In the 2015 survey 
which supported the 2016 Update report, a slightly lesser proportion (22.4%) of IP 
respondents to a survey, stated that, post Jackson, they intended to carry on using 
CFAs as before.83  
A reasonable number have changed their practice by refusing or decreasing the 
number of appointments where there are no assets (15%). In the 2015 survey, 63% of IP 
respondents had expressed the view that they would, post Jackson, reduce the number 
of appointments where there were few or no assets. 
Just over 16% of respondents stated that the Jackson Reforms had led them to stop or 
decrease the amount of litigation they previously took. It is interesting to compare this 
figure with the survey in 2015, where 49% of IP respondents believed that the Jackson 
reforms would lead to them stopping or reducing the amount of insolvency litigation 
they carried out.  
It is reasonably clear that although the Jackson Reforms have had an effect on the 
decisions of some IPs to take appointments over impecunious estates or to pursue legal 
action, the impact has not been as great as was feared. The insolvency profession has 
shown itself to be adaptable to new conditions. 
  
                                                          
83 See Appendix B of the 2016 Update. 




Since the Insolvency Exemption ended, which of the following do you think best 
applies in terms of returns to creditors? Please select one answer 
Answer Choices Responses 
Returns to creditors have been the same as under the previous 
funding regime 
29.41% 25 
Returns to creditors have been less than under the previous 
funding regime 
42.35% 36 
Returns to creditors have been higher than under the previous 
funding regime 
5.88% 5 
Don't know 22.35% 19  
Answered 85  
Skipped 88 
 
It is interesting that virtually all the respondents who had an opinion viewed the effect 
of the Jackson Reforms as having either no effect on creditor returns (29%) or reducing 
the returns to creditors (42%). Despite a small number of views to the contrary, the 
majority of those with an opinion recognise that the Jackson Reforms have reduced 
returns to creditors. The fact that nearly a quarter had no view and nearly a third 
thought returns had remained the same, suggest that for a sizeable proportion of the 
Returns to
creditors have
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profession, the effects of the Jackson Reforms have not been as serious as was feared 
in 2016.84 
Question 14  In the last 12 months how many claims have you undertaken using a 
Damages Based Agreement?  
There were only two respondents who stated they had pursued litigation by use of a 
DBA. There was no detail given as to whether or not their use had been successful. 
Question 15  Do you have any other comments in relation to all forms of funding for 
insolvency litigation?  
Although 64 respondents answered this question, many responses were “no”. The 
following is a general summary of the main points made by respondents. 
Of the substantive answers a number of points were made by individuals. Two 
individuals favoured the introduction of an Australian system to allow creditors who 
did finance insolvency litigation to gain an enhanced return in the event the litigation 
was a success. One of the respondents believed that such a legislative provision would 
be a useful addition to the IP’s toolkit and would complement rather than compete with 
the useful role played by litigation funders. The other respondent who favoured the 
Australian system was of the view that once the Crown’s status as a preferential 
creditor was re-introduced, other creditors would be completely disincentivised to 
support litigation as any proceeds would normally be taken by the Crown. The 
Australian system would ensure such creditors remained engaged. 
A number of respondents emphasised the need to consider all funding options. There 
was a divergence of views in terms of which funding option provided better returns to 
creditors. Some suggested that litigation funding was more effective whilst others 
believed that using a CFA (with or without ATE insurance) generally led to better 
creditor returns. 
Some of the respondents found finding a funder to be a longwinded and time 
consuming process especially where the outcome was uncertain. Some IPs felt that 
funders only wanted to take on “dead certs”. 
A number of respondents found the costs of ATE insurance to be prohibitive which 
made a package from a third party funder which effectively indemnifies office-holders 
against adverse costs to be very attractive. A number of respondents did not feel that 
ATE insurance always covered risks borne by an IP. 
                                                          
84 See in particular the answer to Question 20 of the survey carried out as part of the 2016 Update 
(found in Appendix B) where over 86% of respondents felt that post Jackson, use of third party 
funders would reduce returns to creditors. 
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There was a belief that funders could provide a more flexible approach. A tiered 
recovery for the funder could be more fully explored and might generate higher use. An 
example of this approach was provided in the following terms: there is little risk to 
anyone prior to issuing proceedings so any recovery by the funder could be made 
subject to a de minimis recovery. Any correspondence to the prospective defendant 
could still refer to funding being in place to encourage a settlement but without a 
disproportionate payment to the funder. This type of approach might lead to a greater 
take-up if this type of arrangement was marketed. 
There was a general feeling that the funding market was still developing and that 
further options might appear as competition became keener. 
Certain named funders were mentioned in positive terms. The financing or 
assignment options offered were seen as a “god-send” as they greatly reduced an IP’s 
own time cost accumulation on a case.  
Others believed that funding was still too expensive and not commercially viable 
except in high value cases. One respondent was of the view that it was not possible to 
bring a claim for less than £2m and provide a commercial return to creditors. 
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6.2 Manolete Partners plc Data 
I am very grateful to Manolete Partners plc (“Manolete”) for providing me with access to 
its entire case load and to details of actions which, for various different reasons, they 
decided not to fund. Historically Manolete accepted around 22% of cases offered to it, 
but in the previous 12 months that had increased to 30%. This change is consistent with 
the view that in the past, funders were seen as a “last resort” and therefore tended only 
to be shown the “orphan” cases where a CFA had failed to get a result or was deemed 
too risky even for pursuit under a CFA. Equally, it is clear from publicly available data 
that Manolete now has the requisite financial support to make offers on a much wider 
variety and size of claims, particularly bigger claims. 
 
The “Case Type” diagram shows a breakdown of the types of case Manolete Partners plc 
have taken on either as a funder or by taking an assignment of the action. It should be 
noted that a number of cases involved more than one cause of action. Where this is so, 
each cause of action is recorded as a separate case. It is interesting to note that 
virtually half of the cases involved either a breach of duty by directors (20%) or the non-
payment of a director’s loan (29%). The often related action for the recovery of unlawful 
dividends constituted 7% of cases. General breach of contract actions accounted for 
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(9%) and wrongful trading (4%) were less popular but still made up a significant 
proportion of actions brought. 
 
Of the completed cases, on average half the proceeds went to the insolvent estate, with 
the remaining half covering legal costs and profit for Manolete Partners plc. The 
diagram headed “Total Completed Cases” show the relative percentage of cases with a 
return to Manolete Partners plc. As can be seen, 17% of cases led to no return with 40% 
of cases resulting in a return of less than £50,000. At the top end of the market, only 5% 
of cases led to a return of over £1m. These figures suggest that funders are willing to 
consider claims of all values, although of course, other variables will affect whether or 
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The diagram headed “Case Duration” shows that a quarter of cases are settled or 
otherwise finalised within 6 months of Manolete Partners plc taking action. A further 
44% of actions are finalised between 7 and 12 months. Only 15% of cases continue 
beyond 18 months. The speed with which cases are settled is often seen as a great 
strength of using a funder. In cases where a defendant knows the opposition is either 
funded (or is an assignee funder), the defendant’s mind is often concentrated more 
readily than in cases where an IP office-holder of an impecunious estate is the 
opponent. Although a settlement may not be for the full value of a claim, the speed with 
which it is agreed may outbalance a wish to drag out the action for an extended period 
of time with all the consequent costs which go with such an action. As with all things 
in insolvency, the answer is getting the balance right. There is a need to maximise 
returns but not at the expense of running up needless ongoing costs. 
Actions Purchased or Funded 
It is noteworthy that Manolete Partners plc usually prefers to take an assignment of an 
action rather than merely agreeing to fund it. Not surprisingly, a funder wishes to have 
control of any action the funder is bankrolling. A funded action remains under the 
control of the IP. An assigned action is under the assignee’s control. Since the Jackson 
Reforms became effective in insolvency litigation in 2016, Manolete Partners plc have 
moved from a position where it took an assignment in approximately half of its cases 
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that in its ten year history, over half of its cases have been taken on in the last three 
years. Its business, and the business of funders generally, has significantly increased 
since the Jackson Reforms and particularly in the past year during which IPs have 
become more aware of their options. 
 
 
The diagram headed “Total of Claims Received in 2019” sheds a good deal of light on the 
number and value of cases in insolvencies which require funding support. Manolete 
Partners plc was approached in 2019 with 386 claims representing 432 individual causes 
of action. The breakdown of different types of claim is shown in the diagram with 
misfeasance (19%) and unpaid directors’ loan accounts (18%) again leading the way. 
Ignoring the varied Miscellaneous (16%) category, it is Transactions at an undervalue 
(13%) and Preferences (8%) which are the next most popular actions. 
The total value of all of these claims was approximately £900m. This gives some idea of 
the size of the funded market. It must be borne in mind that a number of these claims 
are likely to have failed to find funding for one reason or another. Nevertheless, the figure 
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comparable to the suggested figure of £720m for the total value of funded claims pursued 
by funded actions considered above at Question 6 of the survey. 
In addition, if the total number of 386 claims considered by Manolete Partners plc in 2019 
is considered in light of the total number of corporate insolvencies (16,84485) and 
personal bankruptcies (16,70286) where an office-holder might be considering taking 
action, the estimated number of actions and the estimated value of the funding market 
appear to seem reasonable. A calculation made by one of the other funders (who was 
interviewed and whose views are included in the next section) took account of average 
numbers of insolvencies and average values of actions brought in the Insolvency and 
Companies List of the Business and Property Courts of England and Wales (and their 
predecessors) over the past ten years. The average annual amount claimed in such 
actions over this period was approximately £1.3bn. This figure includes all actions 
commenced, not just those using CFAs or funding. 
If one considers these different sources, it seems likely that the insolvency litigation 
market (which requires some sort of support or funding) is used to enforce claims of at 
least £1.5bn per annum.87  
                                                          
85 Figures available from the Insolvency Service show for 2019, compulsory liquidations 
numbered 2,970, creditors’ voluntary liquidations numbered 12,060 and there were 1,814 
administrations.   
86 Figures available from the Insolvency Service. 
87 This figure is arrived at by adding the estimated total of claims pursued using a CFA, £800m 
(taken from Question 2 of the survey above) to the estimated total of claims pursued using a 
funder, £720m (taken from Question 6 of the survey). If one extrapolates based upon the total 
number of appointment-taking IPs, 1,236, the total figure is likely to be nearer £3.75bn. 
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6.3 Interviews of Stakeholders September 2019 – March 2020 
6.3.1  Introduction 
One of the dangers in relying upon the results of online surveys is that they may not be 
entirely representative of what is happening. Although the response rate for the online 
survey was very healthy, those results alone would be unlikely to paint the complete 
picture. By the very nature of specific survey questions, there is an inherent risk that 
subtle or complex issues cannot be fully investigated or explained. A number of 
respondents to the survey agreed to be interviewed. In addition, a number of other 
stakeholders were identified and approached for interview. Happily, a large majority of 
those approached were willing to give of their time and expertise in providing their 
views. A number of IPs, from different sizes and types of firm, were interviewed. A 
number of solicitors and barristers who specialise in insolvency litigation were 
interviewed. In addition, a number of funders and insurance brokers were interviewed. 
It is suggested that the number and variety of those interviewed provides an effective 
sense check to the survey data and permits a number of specific issues raised to be 
considered.  
The examples provided by some of those interviewed display slight differences in 
approach by IPs who operate in different parts of the market but, it is hoped, the results 
provide a reasonably clear picture of the views of the relevant stakeholders. The results 
of the interviews are discussed thematically below with a focus on what is likely to be 
in the best interests of creditors. 
6.3.2 Changes in practice since Jackson Reforms 
It is clear that the Jackson Reforms have had a significant impact upon insolvency 
litigation with a general consensus that creditors receive a lesser return from legal 
action than they did before. This was predictable and is one of the obvious 
consequences of the Jackson Reforms. The expansion of the funding market is also a 
development which was predictable. Some of those interviewed viewed the effect of 
the Jackson Reforms to have improved the position of wrongdoers. They have 
curtailed enforcement action and forced IPs to use funders which, in the view of some, 
has led to quicker settlements on reduced numbers.  
The activities of funders are widely perceived to have increased significantly since the 
Jackson Reforms. There is a widespread view that there is less litigation at the lower 
end of the market. Court fees have increased in recent years88 and the additional costs 
of the Jackson Reforms with the need to cover the cost of CFA uplifts and ATE 
                                                          
88 See the Civil Proceedings Fees Order 2008 (SI 2008/1053), Schedule 1 where the fee for 
commencing an action in the High Court or County Court, if claiming over £200,000, is £10,000. If 
the claim is for at least £10,000 but does not exceed £200,000 the fee is 5% of the value of the 
claim. 
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premiums from any damages have made some claims uneconomic to pursue. The 
lower end of the market is often seen as uneconomic to insure by ATE insurers. The 
Jackson Reforms were seen by some of those interviewed as having a “pretty crippling 
effect” on the number of cases being brought with ATE cover. There is a view that many 
IPs will try to settle claims before issuing proceedings and therefore before the need for 
adverse costs cover. One suggested consequence of this is that there are fewer cases 
which apply for ATE cover and when they do the cost is higher than it was pre-
Jackson. The insolvency ATE market appears therefore to have decreased in numbers 
of claims insured with a consequential decrease in the number of active ATE insurers. 
Cases at the bottom of the market are still pursued by IPs, often on the basis of an 
informal CFA with a familiar legal team. If the action is successful, the lawyers will get 
paid with no uplift. The lack of an uplift is one of the costs which the Jackson Reforms 
has taken out of the equation. It was previously common for a 100% uplift to be applied 
even in a simple case.89 If it is unsuccessful, the IP and legal team share the pain of the 
loss of their Work-In-Progress (“WIP”). This type of case is commonly pursued in much 
the same way as before the Jackson Reforms. The only real difference is that ATE 
insurance is no longer always acquired, especially where the IP is confident of success. 
Such claims are at risk of being discontinued if a successful application for security of 
costs is made by the defendant.90  
Some IPs did state that they would never take action without the comfort of ATE 
insurance, even in relatively small cases so there is some divergence of practice at the 
bottom end of the market. An example was provided by one IP that if there was a claim 
for £150,000 pursued on the basis of a CFA, if ATE became necessary, that additional 
cost may make the action uncommercial. In such cases, the IP would therefore 
consider approaching a funder to try to ensure at least some net return to the estate. 
That particular IP explained that he or she would take most cases valued up to 
£100,000, if they were of any complexity, to a funder. In such cases there was likely to 
be a concern over adverse costs and the cost of ATE in such a case itself might be 
anything between £25,000 and £50,000. The only realistic possibility of a return to the 
estate would therefore be to take it to a funder. 
It was suggested that many bankruptcy cases fail to provide a dividend for creditors 
where, for example, the only real asset is a £150,000 share in a matrimonial home. Once 
all costs and fees are paid, there is frequently little or nothing left for creditors. It would 
appear that the decision to allow assignability of corporate office-holder actions but 
not personal office-holder actions is a lacuna which might be filled. It is likely that a 
great deal of smaller claims in bankruptcy, for transactions at an undervalue and 
                                                          
89 See Section 5 of the 2014 Report and Section 2.1F of the 2016 Update. 
90 See Absolute Living Developments Limited (In Liquidation) v DS7 Limited [2018] EWHC 1432 
(Ch) where there was no order for security for costs made. 
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preferences, would be taken up by assignment but are currently often uneconomical 
for an IP to pursue. 
It was generally recognised that funders before Jackson were only offered claims 
which were difficult or which lawyers had refused to pursue on CFA terms. It was 
considered by a number of those interviewed that the market is now turned upon its 
head. Far more cases are offered to funders as a first step. Funders themselves are now 
able to be more selective than before. 
The top end of the market does not appear to be suffering after the Jackson Reforms. 
Larger cases may be able to be funded by the insolvent estate or will still operate on the 
basis of CFAs and ATE cover. Insurance will often cover the cost of at least some of the 
WIP of the IP and legal team. There is some evidence that funders are making inroads 
to this part of the market.  
There are some IPs who have been slow to react to new developments in practice. Not 
all IPs have changed their practices following Jackson and have continued to pursue 
legal action largely as before with the use of CFAs and ATE. It therefore remains 
common for a case valued, for example, at £500,000 to be supported, up to £100,000, by 
an insurer who will cover fees and expenses and take a multiple of the funding 
provided if the action is successful. In such cases, lawyers are often instructed under a 
CFA (with uplift) and ATE insurance is taken. This type of action is conducted much as 
before the Jackson Reforms, but with a reduced return to the estate and therefore to 
creditors.  
There is some evidence that on occasion a creditor will pay a small amount to allow for 
some investigatory work to be conducted but will not finance the whole claim. It is 
common practice for IPs to consult with creditors if legal action is being contemplated 
and to ask creditors if they wish to fund it. In over 95% of cases the answer is no.  
There was a concern expressed that the Jackson Reforms have contributed to a lack of 
creditor engagement in insolvency processes generally. 
6.3.3 Typical Mind Set of IP 
It is perhaps a dangerous thing to try to get into the mind of an IP. It is a disparate 
profession with the activities of some bearing little meaningful comparison with 
others. There is clearly a difference between an IP who concentrates on multi-million 
restructuring appointments and a High Street sole practitioner whose case load is 
mostly small company creditors’ voluntary liquidations. They do all have in common 
fiduciary, statutory and professional duties to conduct appropriate investigations of 
company participators and to take action, where appropriate, in the best interests of 
creditors. The following commentary attempts to give a snapshot of how some IPs 
think. 
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IPs are very much aware of using CFAs and ATE insurance. Most, but by no means all, 
have a working knowledge of other options available such as third party funding or 
assignments of actions. Many IPs will not consider assigning a claim if it is 
straightforward and the defendant has enough assets to settle any likely award. In 
such cases, the IP will usually use lawyers on a CFA basis. In more complex cases, the 
IP has a difficult decision to make. The WIP on a low level but complex case may make 
it uneconomic for the IP to pursue. 
A number of IPs, when presented with a possible cause of action, have as their first 
thought – can we do it in house and carry the WIP? If an IP has a caseload of, for 
example, 50 appointments, he or she may not be able to carry a lot of WIP on each case. 
Some IPs approach this circumstance with more creativity than others. Although most 
IPs prefer to use an hourly rate basis for their remuneration, some have become more 
accustomed to agreeing to a percentage of realisations or distributions. This aligns 
their incentives more readily with the interests of creditors. Some IPs (and others) 
would like to see DBAs amended to make them a more attractive and realistic option 
for the remuneration of legal teams. If IPs and lawyers are all engaged on similar 
contingency terms, (working on a percentage of realisations or distributions with or 
without the support of an insurer or funder) it is suggested their interests would be 
better aligned with the interests of creditors. 
When an IP runs a claim the risks of not winning are significant. A big concern is the 
likely length of proceedings which may not fit well with running an insolvency process 
for any extended period of time. It is not always easy to assess what is in the interest of 
the creditors. On the one hand, the IP does not wish to allow the insolvency process to 
run up large continuing costs in the hope of a return but on the other hand, the IP could 
be criticised for not pursuing the action. If a funder can be used who will fund the 
action and cover the day-to-day costs of the insolvency process, this is likely to lead to 
a better result for the creditors than the IP running up a large amount of unpaid WIP 
and the action eventually being discontinued due to lack of funding. Often creditors are 
relatively happy to see directors made liable even though there is only a small dividend 
return to the creditors themselves.  
In practice, an IP may not have any real need for funding support until action is 
actually taken. Even then, an early Part 3691 offer may lead to resolution. Depending 
upon whether, and to what extent, the defendant makes an offer to settle, the IP may 
then consider how much a funder would offer to purchase the action. A reduced offer 
from the defendant may still be more than the likely realisations from an assignment 
to a funder. Experienced IPs use all of these tools to ensure they have options and can 
then make the best decision in the interests of creditors.  
                                                          
91 CPR 1998 (SI 1998/3132). 
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Decisions as to whether to use a funder or for the IP to litigate are generally decided on 
a case-by-case basis. The factors which inform the decision are usually: complexity, 
value, defendant solvency, legal advice and own WIP and personal costs position.  
Quite where the line is drawn between the IP taking action on the basis of a CFA (with 
or without ATE cover) and using a funder varies from IP to IP and from case to case. 
Many claims for less than £100,000 are now unlikely to be pursued by an IP unless they 
are very straightforward. If they are complex they may or may not appeal to a funder. 
Many IPs will still take on smaller actions and effectively fund the action internally on 
their own WIP and instruct lawyers on a CFA. Some will use their own firm’s money to 
cover expenses such as court fees. A very small number are more actively engaging as 
commercial funders. At the other end of the spectrum, some IPs are very risk averse 
and will not litigate without the support of a funder or ATE insurance to cover any 
possible adverse costs order. 
One IP explained that IPs have “a menu – can creditors fund? Can I do it on a CFA? 
Otherwise I will consider a funder.” 
Many IPs emphasised that they act in what they believe to be the best interests of the 
creditors when making these decisions. They are keen to ensure that creditors are 
consulted and receive regular reports on the progress of any litigation.  
6.3.4 Examples of typical cases and the difficult decisions an IP must make 
It was common for IPs who were interviewed to explain the difficult decisions which 
they often face by providing specific case examples or examples of issues they face. 
At the lower end of the market, one IP explained that if there was a simple claim on a 
director’s loan account for £20,000, lawyers would be instructed on an informal CFA 
without uplift. If ATE became necessary the action would not be pursued as there 
would be no likely return to creditors. 
One IP explained that in general terms, if there is a claim for £30,000 and the likely 
costs will be in the region of £15,000, action may not be taken as, by the time the IP’s 
costs are factored in, there will be nothing for creditors. If the claim was worth £60,000 
and the likely costs were £15,000, it was far more likely that action would be taken. 
One example involved a £800,000 claim. Counsel had assessed its likely success to be 
65-70%. A CFA with a 100% uplift was agreed with lawyers along with ATE insurance, 
the consideration for which was deferred. There were no assets in the estate. Creditors 
were asked if they wished to support the action but they declined. The IP would be 
criticised if he or she did not take action in such a case. Unfortunately the case was 
lost and there was no money for an appeal. Everyone concerned had to write off their 
WIP and the insurer had to cover the defendant’s costs. Even if the case had been won, 
most of the receipts would have gone on costs.  
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One IP explained that for claims of less than £2m there was always a very difficult 
decision as to what to do as costs and fees of a court hearing will often use up a good 
deal of any recoveries. Therefore, if there is a claim for £250,000 and the IP can get 
£20,000 upfront from a funder (with an agreed percentage of any recovery), this may be 
enough to cover the IP’s own WIP and still possibly lead to a dividend for creditors if the 
case is a success.  
If an IP has a claim for £200,000, it might be that the IP fee would take up £30,000 of 
that; solicitors perhaps £60,000 on a CFA plus an uplift of a similar amount. With 
counsel’s fee together with an uplift, and ATE if needed, there will be little if anything 
left for a dividend to creditors. In such cases, the IP needs to consider using a funder as 
that might lead to a better result for creditors. 
A common complaint from IPs related to the cost of ATE insurance. One IP had a claim 
for £350,000 and was contemplating initiating the action on the basis of CFAs and ATE. 
The ATE premium would have been £75,000. With the other costs, it made more 
commercial sense to use a funder where the return to the estate was almost certain to 
be higher. 
A further example given was a live claim in a winding up for £500,000. The estate had 
no funds. The IP considered instructing lawyers on a CFA basis and taking out ATE 
insurance. The defendant director was defending. In such a case, it might be better to 
use a funder to crack a difficult and delaying defendant. The problem was that if, for 
example, £400,000 was recovered, only about 25% of that would find its way to the 
estate due to the legal costs and funder’s percentage. Although this might be less than 
one would ideally like, it was certainly going to be better than nothing which would 
most likely be the case if there was no funding support. 
The above examples give an indication of the difficult decision which faces an IP when 
looking to realise the value in a cause of action. Each case turns on its own facts and 
different IPs have, legitimately, different views as to what is likely to lead to the best 
result for creditors. At least one IP interviewed was of the view that insolvency 
litigation, being inherently public interest litigation, ought to be subject to a system of 
enforced mediation in cases worth less than £1m with limited disclosure and a listing 
for a limited time. This would ensure litigation costs were kept down and provide for 
better returns to creditors. 
6.3.5 Comments on use of CFA and ATE insurance 
There is a reasonably widespread belief that there are fewer ATE insurers active in the 
insolvency market than before the Jackson Reforms. A number of those interviewed 
linked this to the reduction in personal injury claims post Jackson. With less personal 
injury work available, there is a belief that some ATE insurers have left the market in 
general or at least reduced their activity. Most IPs interviewed felt that the cost of ATE 
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insurance had increased significantly following the Jackson Reforms. Some of those 
interviewed viewed the ATE offering post-Jackson as more realistic. They perceived 
that ATE insurers are now more careful in providing adverse costs cover. This 
manifests itself in a delay in IPs receiving an answer to their queries and a common 
requirement for an upfront payment of at least part of the ATE premium. It was 
extremely common before the Jackson reforms for ATE insurers not to require any 
payment upfront with the whole premium deferred and contingent upon success. One 
ATE broker interviewed contradicted this view by stating that a majority of the 20 or so 
ATE insurers active in the insolvency market will still provide ATE insurance (within 
financial limits) with a wholly deferred consideration. Others were of the view that a 
10% upfront premium was common. It is likely that both views are true as practice 
would appear to vary from insurer to insurer and case to case. 
Some of those interviewed believed that IPs could generally use ATE more creatively. 
IPs tend to wait until court proceedings are inevitable to get ATE cover. The cost is 
higher at this stage than if taken out earlier. If taken out earlier, it may be used to 
convince a prospective defendant that the IP is serious and this in itself may lead to an 
early settlement offer without the need to issue proceedings. There is an element of 
Catch 22 about this conundrum. If ATE is obtained early and the matter does not get to 
court, creditors may complain that the cost of it was an unnecessary expense. If 
obtaining ATE is left until later and its costs are therefore higher, again a creditor may 
complain that it was not acquired earlier. 
There was a view that IPs could obtain better ATE cover if they shopped around and 
negotiated on detailed terms of cover. There was perceived to be a need to ensure that 
ATE insurers adjust their offerings to be claimant friendly in terms of satisfying an 
application for adverse costs.92 Although there is some suggestion that ATE insurers 
are making this change, the views expressed were not universally convinced that all 
ATE insurers were providing this type of cover.  
A number of advocates of the use of CFA and ATE insurance were of the view that the 
ATE insurance market was capable of being more flexible than merely covering 
possible adverse costs. There is an indication that ATE insurers are willing to fund 
actions in a way similar to commercial funders. They may cover the cost of an IP’s WIP 
and other expenses without requiring an assignment of the action. They may or may 
not require a payment upfront. Their return will usually be a multiple of the funding 
provided rather than a percentage of the net damages (assuming success). One broker 
was of the view that opening the eyes of an IP to the options available was like 
“extolling the virtues of 5G to a person who still used only a landline telephone”. 
                                                          
92 For examples of the difficulty faced by IPs where an ATE policy is not found sufficient to 
satisfy an order to cover adverse costs, see Rowe v Ingenious Media Holdings plc [2020] EWHC 
235 (Ch) and Re Hotel Portfolio II UK Ltd [2020] EWHC 233 (Comm). 
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There was a suggestion that not all CFA contracts are compliant with legislative 
provisions and that they may in fact amount to illegal contingency or DBA agreements. 
The most common problem associated by IPs with the use of CFAs was the fact that 
lawyers will often invest a lot of their own WIP in a case and after a year or two if it has 
not progressed, it tends to drop to the bottom of their list of priorities. This is not 
particularly a problem with the CFA model as with the motivation of the lawyers 
involved. Either way, there is a risk, if an IP uses lawyers who are carrying a lot of WIP 
on a case, that they may favour early settlement to pay their own costs which may or 
may not be consistent with the IP’s duty to creditors.  
6.3.6 Comments on Use of Funders 
There was a general view that most funders are nowadays willing to look at cases of 
any size. It was a common criticism of funders before the Jackson Reforms that they 
only looked at claims worth millions. There was a view that in many cases, the use of a 
funder may lead to a better result than using a CFA and ATE insurance. Some IPs look 
to settle a claim before the need for ATE arises, but once ATE becomes necessary they 
will then consider a funder instead as the alternative may be better for creditors on the 
facts. 
There was a general view that IPs often follow the advice of their lawyers as to whether 
or not to use a funder. There is clearly a tendency for IPs and lawyers to have close 
contacts with one another and with funders. The mutual trust and confidence that has 
built up in some of these relationships is a factor in deciding which lawyers and 
funders to approach. 
A funder is often approached if the IP believes that the action is too big or too complex 
to be funded purely on a CFA and ATE basis. Funders were also used by IPs when they 
sensed an action was becoming too personal. The objective intervention of a funder in 
such cases was seen as helpful.  
Some of those interviewed believed that funding did not yet feel like the norm. Others 
had a very different view. Some of those interviewed, certainly outside the big 
commercial cities, were slowly becoming used to the idea of using a funder. The 
appointment by some funders of well-known regional representatives was 
encouraging IPs to trust more readily those funders.   
One experienced IP commented that the cost of using a funder has not come down 
with competition but the size and quality of the claim which they are willing to take on 
has come down. 
It is not clear how many funders are currently operating in the insolvency market. One 
estimate by a broker put the figure at between 60 and 80. Some funders specialise in 
particular types of claim but most have a more general case load. It appears that there 
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are a number of well-known and very large undertakings operating but also that there 
are a number of newer, smaller organisations. A number of IPs commented that their 
email inboxes are inundated with offers from unknown new funders. One IP 
commented that there appeared to be almost a two-tier system of funders, whereby if a 
larger, more established funder said no to a claim, it was picked up by one of the other 
funders. It is clear that some funders will look at any claim over £20,000 although it is 
more common for them to look at cases beginning at £50,000. One IP commented that 
funders are only interested in supporting the best cases but recognised that this was 
what one would expect from a commercial organisation. A small number of funders are 
willing to take on riskier cases for greater rewards. The market is developing its own 
niches. 
A number of former practitioners, including both IPs and lawyers, are now entering the 
funding market by taking assignments of actions and doing much of the work in-house 
themselves. With ATE cover in place to satisfy any security for costs application, 
smaller claims may be commercially viable with a reasonable chance of a dividend to 
creditors. 
More than one IP believed that lawyers now more commonly advise an IP to use a 
funder rather than engage the lawyers on a CFA even where there was a strong case. 
There was a suggestion of self-interest in operation here in that some funders would 
ensure full payment of the lawyers’ fees as against the uncertainty of a CFA. No 
funders interviewed found this to be a concern. It was also commented on that the use 
of a funder often carried less risk to the IP’s own WIP. Some funders are willing to cover 
an IP’s WIP in certain cases. 
There was a general belief that most funders prefer now to take an assignment of a 
cause of action and some will only take assignments. Some IPs were concerned by the 
loss of IP control once the action is assigned. The problem identified was that a funder 
may wish to settle an action quickly for less than it might generate if it were continued. 
Although this was a concern expressed, most IPs recognised the need for the funder to 
make a commercial decision and no-one gave an example where an early settlement 
had not been in the best interests of creditors.  
One IP pointed out that even where a funder is used, there is still often work to do to 
comply with the requirements of that funder and that the costs of that compliance may 
amount to tens of thousands of pounds of WIP. The IP did point out that these costs can 
be managed by ensuring most of the preparatory work is done before approaching a 
funder or asking the funder for upfront costs of such investigation. Some funders will 
pay for investigatory work especially in relation to the solvency of a prospective 
defendant. 
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One of the benefits of approaching a funder is that if they refuse to support an action, 
this provides some comfort for the IP who can explain to creditors why no action is 
being taken.  
Overall, most of those interviewed saw funding as a good thing for creditors as more 
cases are taken up than would otherwise be the case. Even where returns were 
relatively small, even a small return was better for creditors than none. 
Prior to the Jackson Reforms, it was often the case that a lawyer was engaged under 
the terms of a CFA with a 100% uplift even where the case was quite straightforward. 
One IP was of the view that a comparable practice might be seen where funders 
required, for example, 5 times their financial commitment, even where the case was 
very simple. The IP might be able to find a better deal elsewhere or negotiate better 
terms with the funder. Funders are seen as commonly requiring a return of 3 times the 
capital they provide. 
Some IPs (and others) expressed concern about the financial strength of some funders. 
They felt that they were more likely to trust those with financial backing and with a 
good reputation. Those who were seen as being endorsed by or who had work with 
professional bodies were more likely to be trusted than newer unknown funders. There 
were a number of concerns expressed in relation to: who owned some of the funders; 
their capital value (in case they had to satisfy an adverse costs order; and where the 
money came from and went to (if the claim was successful). 
Although the Government had considered the possibility of the need to regulate 
funders, there is no legally enforceable regulatory regime in place. There is self-
regulatory organisation named the Association of Litigation Funders of England and 
Wales to which a relatively small number of funders belong. The court has failed to 
recognise membership in itself as a badge of creditworthiness.93  
A number of those interviewed explained that having used different funders at 
different times, their experience has taught them to carry out more rigorous financial 
due diligence than they did when first using funders. This was to ensure that the 
funder would be able to satisfy any adverse costs order which might otherwise fall to 
the IP to satisfy. IPs need to ensure they are not at risk personally if an action is funded 
or assigned. If they remain financially interested in the action, their residual risk 
remains. Only if they have sold the action outright does that risk disappear. 
A number of funders were characterised by some interviewees as management 
companies, managing not their own money but money held by large hedge funds. 
Large cases are often funded through the creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle 
specially created and funded for that one action. The suspicion is that such funders 
                                                          
93 See Rowe v Ingenious Media Holdings plc [2020] EWHC 235 (Ch) at [137]. 
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appear to be unregulated and if things were to go wrong, it is not always apparent to 
whom recourse may be had. Those providing insurance are regulated. Funders are not 
subject to any regulatory regime. There was a concern that some funders may be under 
capitalised or otherwise be unreliable contractors. Some funders are not seen as 
having any expertise in the area. 
Despite there being suspicions about some funders, others are well trusted and the first 
port of call for some IPs considering taking action. IPs appreciate that one of the main 
benefits of using a funder is that the defendant understands how serious the matter is. 
The “sledgehammer of funding often cracks the nut.” IPs appreciate the public policy 
benefit of taking action in relation to culpable behaviour and that even if the recovery 
is less than it might have been pre-Jackson, some recovery is better than none. The 
use of a funder was also recognised by many as providing a far quicker resolution to a 
dispute than other options. The benefit of such speedy resolution often has the positive 
side-effect of keeping down overall costs and so leads to a higher recovery. In contrast, 
it was recognised by some who were interviewed that a legal team instructed on the 
basis of a CFA will usually benefit more the longer an action continues, with a 
consequential increase in overall costs. 
A number of IPs pointed out that selling an action and asking for funding are 
conceptually very different. Creditors are owed fiduciary and professional duties by an 
IP but once the cause of action is assigned to a commercial entity the assignee owes 
none of those duties to the creditors. The assignee looks to settle an action on the most 
attractive terms possible, from its own point of view. The IP needs to keep this in mind 
when considering the terms of any assignment. 
6.3.7 Portfolio Funding 
There appears to be a debate within the IP profession as to whether it is possible for an 
IP to enter into a portfolio approach to acquire funding from a funder. The idea is that 
an IP may need a line of funding available across a number of actions covering a 
number of insolvent estates. There appears to be a lack of consensus as to how such 
portfolio agreements work.  
There is a view that their effect is that the proceeds of any claims that are successful 
may be used to cover the cost of funding across the whole portfolio. If the effect of such 
an agreement is that money belonging to one insolvent estate (and therefore held for 
the benefit of one group of creditors) is used to pay for the costs of litigation brought on 
behalf of a different insolvent estate (and therefore a different group of creditors), the IP 
would appear to be acting in breach of duty. It may be possible that such portfolio 
agreements can be made to work, where the creditor or creditors are the same in 
different insolvent estates (HMRC, for example), and such creditors provide their fully 
informed consent to the process.  
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An alternative and more reasonable version of portfolio funding is that where an IP 
requires funding across a number of cases, the costs of that funding may be brought 
down for individual cases, where an agreement across a broader portfolio can be 
agreed. In such circumstances, there appears to be no question of the proceeds of a 
successful case being used to pay the costs of an unsuccessful case. This appears to be 
one option which IPs use to cover the costs of their own WIP across a group of cases. 
6.3.8 Knowledge of the Market Ensuring Best Interests of Creditors  
It is clear that some IPs are very sophisticated users of funding and legal services and 
fully understand how they need to conduct themselves in order to satisfy their duties 
to creditors. A strong message which came out of the interview process was that the 
IPs interviewed did, without exception, have a very strong understanding of their 
duties. They were very conscious of the need to ensure their decision was in the best 
interests of creditors. Their actions were motivated by what would most likely lead to 
the payment of a dividend to creditors. This commitment to creditors was clear when 
talking to, at one end of the profession, senior partners in very large IP firms and, at the 
other, sole practitioner IPs.  
However, it is clear from the interviews that the IP profession is a broad church. There 
is a reasonably widespread belief that some IPs do not fully understand the options 
open to them when considering how to finance a legal action. Some of these IPs are 
risk averse and are generally reluctant to bring litigation. In a similar vein, some IPs are 
reluctant to take appointments which “look or smell wrong”. Some IPs rely upon work 
from directors of companies and, for a variety of reasons, may be slow to initiate 
actions against those directors in a subsequent liquidation. Hostile appointments are 
quite rare in practice and so there is often a (limited) pre-existing relationship between 
the IP and directors. Some IPs suspect that in such cases, any investigation is likely to 
be reasonably swift and may not be as rigorous as creditors might wish. IPs in such 
cases need to be clear that their duty is to the creditors. They do not owe any duty to 
the directors (even if the directors are underwriting their fees in some capacity).  
In cases where taking action becomes inevitable, IPs are naturally keen to ensure 
certainty as to their own position. IPs rely upon the legal advice they receive as to how 
to deal with a potential cause of action. Legal advice is usually a significant factor in 
any decision-making process. An assignment to a funder is often a very attractive 
option for such IPs. It is, of course, necessary for such IPs to be confident that their 
decision-making is in the best interests of the creditors, not just in the best interests of 
the IP or the lawyers.  
There was some anecdotal evidence that some IPs invite funders to look over their files 
in order to identify whether there are any likely causes of action which could be taken 
to swell the assets of the estate. Whilst this activity suggests that the IPs in question 
Page 56 of 61 
 
have not satisfied their duties to their creditors fully, it may actually point in the other 
direction. If an IP is not convinced an action is viable, if a funder disagrees, and is 
willing to fund, or take an assignment of, a cause of action, the result may be a return to 
creditors where no return would otherwise be possible. This practice might be worth 
considering by IPs who do not have the investigatory skills or experience of some of 
the funders. 
It was considered by some interviewed that R3 and the professional bodies have failed 
their members by not providing clear guidance on the options available to them. The 
view was also expressed that if professional and trade bodies frequently hold events 
sponsored by certain funders, this provides a vote of confidence in favour of those 
funders which IPs take as a recommendation. This criticism is arguably based upon a 
failure by those who favour other ways of supporting insolvency litigation to get their 
message across to the profession. It is certainly the case that funders such as Manolete 
Partners plc have invested often, in sponsoring all kinds of insolvency related events. 
Their brand recognition is high amongst stakeholders due partly to these activities. It is 
a marketplace where it is incumbent upon all players to make their products known. 
Those offering different funding products need to make those products better known in 
order to convince the profession that they are viable as an alternative. A central 
comparison service where different products and different funding options may be 
considered by IPs would be extremely useful. 
The funding market appeals to a number of different types of IP. One concern 
expressed was that too many IPs see funding as an easy way to cover their own WIP 
and to pay a dividend by giving all the work away to the funder. IPs ought to ensure 
that they consider alternative options when looking to fund an action. They ought to 
document their decisions so that it is clear that they have not merely repeated their 
common practice of approaching one firm of solicitors and one funder. Solicitors want 
to get paid their fees. If they recommend a funder who covers their fees, they must still 
be able to show that they are acting in the best interests of their client. 
6.3.9 Official Receiver, HMRC and Secretary of State 
A number of those interviewed were of the view that the Official Receiver could do 
more to encourage returns to creditors. When acting as liquidator or trustee in 
bankruptcy, there was a general view that the Official Receiver is reluctant to take 
action on behalf of creditors. Funders are keen to work with the Official Receiver on 
such cases. In cases where attempts are made to appoint a private sector IP to replace 
the Official Receiver, it is claimed that the Official Receiver, often with the support of 
HMRC as the majority creditor, prevent such appointments. 
The Secretary of State (or the Official Receiver) may also consider using more widely 
the powers under section 15A of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 
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which allow for the court to order compensation against a disqualified director.94 It 
seems strange that the Secretary of State often expends great time and money in 
disqualifying an individual and does not also request a compensation order. Some 
reasonable liaison with IPs might lead to significantly greater returns to creditors with 
relatively little extra effort.  
There would appear to be a case for the Official Receiver to consider how the duty to 
act in the best interests of creditors may be satisfied in such cases either by taking 
action, assigning action or appointing different office-holders. 
 
  
                                                          
94 At the time of writing there has only been one case reported under section 15A: Re Noble 
Vintners Ltd [2019] EWHC 2806 (Ch). 
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7 Summary of Main Findings 
1 Although the Jackson Reforms have had a significant impact upon how 
insolvency litigation is funded, their effect has not been as serious as some had 
predicted. 
2 The overall value of claims being pursued using different forms of support 
(whether CFAs, ATE, funding or assignment) is likely to have increased since 
2015 from approximately £1bn to nearer £1.5bn95 per annum. 
3 IPs and their advisors are very aware of their duty to act in the best interests of 
creditors.  
4 The funding and assignment market is still developing but has increased 
significantly in the past 4 years. 
5 Many IPs are sophisticated users of funding and legal options whilst others 
remain inexperienced and are not yet fully informed of the options available to 
them. 
6 Each case needs to be considered individually as to how its progress may result 
in the best result for creditors.  
7 There is a potential lack of transparency with the identity and creditworthiness 
of some insurers and funders. 
8 The funding and assignment marketplace is becoming more varied with some 
niche specialisms developing. 
9 ATE (and other) insurers need to react to changes in the marketplace. 
10 Government agencies including the Official Receiver and HMRC could do more 
to encourage the pursuit of culpable behaviour and to co-operate more with the 
private sector.  
                                                          
95 If one extrapolates from the survey results based upon the total number of appointment-
taking IPs, 1,236, the total value of claims being pursued per annum may be as high as £3.75bn. 
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8  Recommendations 
It is clear that things have moved on since my last report in 2016. The use of CFAs and 
ATE insurance continue to be very important tools for IPs. Funding and assignments of 
actions are now an integral and important part of the system and ought to be 
considered by IPs when considering enforcing any cause of action. Despite these 
developments, it seems that the costs of CFAs and ATE on the one hand and Funding 
and Assignments on the other have remained high. Competition has not yet had the 
desired effect of maximising returns to creditors. This may be partly because the 
market is not yet operating in a fully-informed manner. As its users become more 
informed they are likely to become more efficient users of the market. 
In considering statutory changes, case law developments and the practical reactions to 
them, of insolvency professionals and the funding and insurance market, a number of 
observations may be made which may assist in ensuring that more is done to satisfy 
the duty to act in the best interests of creditors. Guidance might be issued to IPs in the 
form of a Statement of Insolvency Practice or Guidance Note dealing with specific 
issues they need to consider when conducting litigation. That guidance might cover 
the following: 
1 There is a need for IPs to be provided with guidance as to the options open to 
them when contemplating taking legal action; 
2 That guidance needs to explain the benefits and risks of each option; 
3 IPs need guidance on the due diligence they need to conduct when 
instructing lawyers on a CFA basis and when using ATE insurance to cover 
any adverse costs award; 
4 Whether or not the funding market remains unregulated, IPs need to be 
made aware of the due diligence they need to carry out when working with a 
funder;96 
5 There is a need for a mechanism whereby IPs might be able to obtain 
multiple quotations from funders for supplying funding or taking an 
assignment.  
In order to maximise returns to creditors a number of other changes might be 
considered: 
1 The rules on DBAs could be amended to make them fit for purpose in an 
insolvency context; 
2 The maximum percentage uplift on a CFA could be increased for insolvency 
litigation; 
                                                          
96 The types of question they might wish to ask are reproduced in Appendix 1. I am very grateful 
to Steven Cooklin of Manolete Partners plc for producing this checklist. 
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3 Bankruptcy office-holder actions should be made capable of assignment to 
mirror the position in corporate insolvency; 
4 The Official Receiver should consider working more closely with the private 
sector and consider taking advantage of assigning (or otherwise realising) 
claims for the benefit of creditors; 
5 The Secretary of State should consider liaising more closely with the private 
sector to apply for more compensation orders, in appropriate cases, under 
the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
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Appendix One 
Suggested Checklist When Using a Funder or Assignee 
1. Does the Funder have a demonstrable track record in financing insolvency 
litigation claims? 
2. What is the minimum case size the Funder will consider? 
3. Is the finance provided open-ended or subject to a defined limited 
commitment by the Funder? 
4. Is a counsel opinion essential for my case to be considered? 
5. Does the Funder offer an assignment option or funding only? 
6. Can I retain a % interest in the final outcome? 
7. Can I sell the claim in its entirety at the outset, taking a single one-off 
payment into the Estate? 
8. Does the Funder provide me and the Estate with a clear and full adverse cost 
indemnity or do I need to source ATE as well? 
9. What is the financial strength of the Funder that backs its indemnity and 
will that satisfy any Security for Costs issue? 
10. Do I get to choose the legal team who work on this case going forward? 
11. Where I have assigned the case: will I remain involved or at least be kept 
regularly informed of progress on the case? Can I participate in any ADR 
meetings if I choose to do so? 
12. Can I receive some money into the Estate upfront to defray some/all of my 
and my lawyer’s WIP and how do I recover any remaining outstanding costs 
incurred prior to the assignment/funding agreement? 
13. Will the legal team have to work on a full or partial CFA or do they get paid as 
the work is completed, at base rates? 
14. Can the IPs’ litigation support/further investigation costs be covered by the 
Funder? 
15. What % of the final recovery will the Estate get? Does that % increase as the 
recovery level increases? 
 
